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IS TEXAS TOUGH ON CRIME BUT SOFf ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE?

Adam M. Gershowitz*
Although Texas is well known for imposing tough punishments on convicted
defendants, it is surprisingly generous in affording criminal procedure protections. In a variety of areas, including search and seizure rules, confession
requirements, the availability of bail, prosecutorial discovery obligations, and
jury trial guarantees, Texas affords protections vastly in excess of what is
required by the United States Constitution. Even more shocking, these criminal
procedure guarantees come almost entirely from Texas statutes approved by
the legislature, not activist rules imposed by judges. This Article explores
Texas s reputation as a tough-on-crime state and the seeming inconsistency
between Texas being tough on crime but generous on criminal procedure.

Everyone knows that Texas is tough on crime. Over the last four decades, Texas
has sent more than 1000 inmates to death row, making it the "capital of capital
punishment." 1 Texas is also a leader in incarceration: with nearly 175,000 of its
residents behind bars, 2 Texas ranks first in the nation in raw incarceration3 and
second in per capita incarceration. 4 Shaming punishments are also popular in the
Lone Star State; one judge shamed so many offenders that his constituents elected
him to Congress as a result. 5 It is therefore not surprising that many people
mistakenly think "Don't Mess With Texas" is the state's motto, 6 rather than simply
a clever bumper sticker designed to fight littering. 7
* Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. An earlier draft of this Article was presented at the
Southeastern Association of Law Schools panel "Is Criminal Procedure Less Counterrnajoritarian Than We
Think?" I am grateful to Doug Berman, Corinna Barrett Lain, Arnold Loewy, Richard Meyers, and Ron Wright
for helpful suggestions.© 2012, Adam M. Gershowitz.
I. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties' Role in the
Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REv. 307, 308 (2010) [hereinafter Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment]
(referring to Texas as the "capital of capital punishment").
2. See HEATHER C. WEST, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DATA BRIEF: PRISONERS AT YEAREND 2009-ADVANCE COUNTS
tbl. 1 (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/py09ac.pdf.
3. See Adam Liptak, 1 in JOOAdults Behind Bars, New Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,2008, at Al4 (noting
that Texas had recently passed California in having the nation's largest number of inmates).
4. See Mike McPhee, State's Inmate Count Up 3.3%: Growth Outpaces National Rate, DENVER POST, Aug. 12,
2001, at B-04 (explaining that Texas had the second highest per capita incarceration rate, following Louisiana).
5. See Ryan J. Huschka, Sorry for the Jackass Sentence: A Critical Analysis of the Constitutionality of
Contemporary Shaming Punishments, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 803, 833-34 (2006) (explaining the popularity of
judges who use shaming punishments).
6. Ironically, the state motto is actually "Friendship." See Texas Facts, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 31,
2001, at 2B.
7. The slogan "Don't Mess With Texas" was created by the State Transportation Department for an
anti-littering campaign in 1985. See "Don't Mess" with This Texas Slogan: State Agency Might Sue over Use ofIts
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Yet, the story about Texas criminal justice is far more complicated than its
reputation reveals. Despite its tough-on-crime reputation, Texas actually has
numerous criminal procedure rules that are very favorable to criminal defendants.
These pro-defendant protections are not mandated by the United States Constitution or the courts. Rather, Texas's pro-defendant criminal procedure rules are
almost exclusively created by Texas statutes enacted by elected. legislators, not
judges. 8 These protections include strict rules on the admissibility of confessions,
extremely pro-defendant search and seizure guarantees, tough limits on denying
bail to criminal defendants, favorable discovery rules, and expansive jury trial
rights, to name a few. In some instances, the rules are so favorable to defendants
that almost every other state in the nation has rejected them. These rules are a
major hindrance to prosecutors and thus directly contradict the notion that Texas is
universally hostile to criminal defendants.
This Article explores Texas's reputation as a tough-on-crime state, as well as the
little-known fact that the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure ("Texas Code") is
quite favorable to criminal defendants. Of course, I do not want to overstate my
case. I am not arguing that Texas has the most pro-defendant code of criminal
procedure in the nation, nor am I asserting in any way that the protections Texas
affords are bad public policy. Rather, I am simply making a descriptive observation
that Texas is not nearly as tough as its reputation suggests when it comes to
criminal procedure. Part I of this Article begins by reviewing reasons why Texas is
commonly seen as tough on crime: from its use of the death penalty, to its packed
prisons, to its indeterminate sentencing scheme which can result in huge upfront
sentences that are reduced on the back-end by parole. Part II then reviews some of
Texas's criminal procedure rules that make it far more favorable to criminal
defendants than other states. Finally, Part III raises possible reasons for the
inconsistency between Texas's punitiveness and its favorable criminal procedure
rules.
I.

TEXAS

Is TOUGH ON CRIME (OR So IT SEEMS)

It is not hard to make the case for Texas being tough on crime. From capital
punishment to incarceration to shaming sanctions, Texas is at the forefront of
imposing stiff punishments. In the Sections below, I offer a brief tour of Texas's
reputation for punitiveness.

Catchphrase, ASSOCIATED PREss (June 6, 2004), http://www.msnbc.msn.cornlid/5151681/nslbusiness/t/don'tmess. However, it was quickly co-opted by bumper sticker and t-shirt manufacturers. See id.
8. Indeed, it is only recently that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the lockstep approach and began
to interpret the Texas Constitution independently of the United States Constitution. See George E. Dix, Judicial
Independence in Defining Criminal Defendants' Texas Constitutional Rights, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1374 (1990)
("Texas has a tradition of general judicial passivity in criminal litigation." ); Jessica L. Schneider, Breaking Stride:
The Texas Coun of Criminal Appeals ' Rejection of the Lockstep Approach 1988-1998, 62 ALB . L. REv. 1593,
1598 (1999) .
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A. The Capital of Capital Punishment
Texas is the most frequent user of capital punishment in the United States,
9

sending more people to death row than any other state. And unlike other states
that frequently impose the death penalty, Io Texas actually carries out executions. II
Since the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment in
executed more than

460

1976,

Texas has

inmates, Iz which is well over one-third of all executions

3

nationwide.I In some years, Texas accounts for nearly half of all executions.I

4

Because of its frequent use of the death penalty, Texas has been responsible for a
large share of controversial executions, which has furthered the state's reputation
for punitiveness. Is In

2007,

the presiding judge of Texas's highest criminal court,

Sharon Keller, received nearly universal condemnation for closing the courthouse
doors at 5pm to an inmate seeking a stay of execution following a promising
Supreme Court decision.I 6 Despite an initial finding of misconduct, Judge Keller
was eventually spared any punishment on technical grounds, thus prolonging the
firestorm about the failures of Texas's capital punishment system.
In

2010, The New Yorker

published an expose on the

17

2004

execution of

Cameron Todd Willingham, who had been executed for killing his three children in
conjunction with the arson of his home.I

8

Based on analysis by nationally

9. See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008 (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). Until
2004, Texas was the consistent leader nationwide. See id. In recent years, Texas has taken a backseat to California
and Florida. See id.
10. For example, California has roughly 700 people languishing on death row. See State by State Database,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
11. See Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2012), available at http://www.death
penaltyinfo.orgldocuments/FactSheet.pdf (providing statistics showing Texas's execution rate of roughly fourteen people per year to be higher than that of any other state).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. For instance, in 2009, Texas was responsible for twenty-four of the fifty-two executions in the United
States. 2009 Execution Statistics, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/home (follow
"Execution Database" hyper! ink; then search "Year" for "2009"; then follow "Apply" hyperlink). In 2006, Texas
accounted fortwenty-four of the fifty-three executions. See 2006 Execution Statistics, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/home (follow "Execution Database" hyper! ink; then search "Year" for "2006";
then follow "Apply" hyperlink).
15. See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Controversy Builds in Texas over an Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2009, at A4 (discussing the national attention paid to Texas executions).
16. See, e.g., Michael Hall, The Judgment of Sharon Keller: As She Goes on Trial This Month, Nearly
Everyone-Journalists, Lawyers, and Even Some of Her Colleagues-Is Calling for Her Head, TEX. MoNTHLY,
Aug. 1, 2009, at 106; Hilary Hylton, A Texas Judge on Trial: Closed to a Death-Row Appeal?, TIME (Aug. 13,
2009), http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816, 1915814,00.html.
17. See Mary Alice Robbins, Case Closed: Special Court of Review Vacates Public Warning, Charges Against
Keller, TEX. LAWYER, Oct. 18, 2010, at 1, http://www.law.uh.edu/news/faculty-news/Fal12010/1018Dow.pdf.
Rather than quietly let the sorry episode disappear, the judge lashed out at critics by brashly (and inaccurately)
claiming, "I won ... People can call it what they want." See id.
18. See David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an innocent Man, THE NEw YORKER, Sept. 29,2009, at
34.
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renowned fire investigators, the article concluded that the fire had been accidental,
not arson, and that Willingham had been innocent. 19 The article unleashed a
mountain of negative publicity about Texas's use of capital punishment. 20 And
rather than own up to the wrongful execution, state leaders attempted to scuttle the
truth? 1 Just two days before a forensic commission was due to begin hearings on
the matter, Governor Rick Perry replaced the head of the body, and the new
commissioner promptly canceled the hearing, leading once again to major national
coverage. 22
Less than a year later, Texas made headlines with the release of death row
inmate Anthony Graves, who was not simply mistakenly convicted, 23 but was
railroaded onto death row as a result of egregious prosecutorial misconduct. 24
Graves was the twelfth Texas inmate exonerated from death row since the
reinstatement of capital punishment. 25
Nor are controversies over the Texas death penalty exclusively of recent
vintage. The 1998 execution of Karla Faye Tucker, a born-again Christian who
found God in prison, sparked a national debate about rehabilitation when thenGovernor George W. Bush refused to pardon her.Z 6 And Governor Bush's seeming
indifference to whether the death penalty had been fairly administered under his
watch-along with criticism of his legal team's inattention to clemency requests27tagged Texas with a reputation for executing first and asking questions later, or
perhaps not at all. 28
The dozens of Texas death penalty cases decided by the Supreme Court have left
an indelible impression that Texas is synonymous with capital punishment. 29 And

19. See id.
20. See, e.g., McKinley, Jr., supra note 15.
21. See Christy Hoppe, Perry Ousts Officials Before Arson Hearing: He's Assailed as New Head Delays
Session on Flawed Case That Led to Execution, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. I, 2009, at I.
22. See id.; see also Steve Mills, Texas Death Penalty Inquiry Shaken: The Chairman, Fired Recently by Gov.
Perry, Says Officials Pressured Him in the Case of an Executed Man, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12,2009, at 15.
23. See Former Death Row Inmate Freed in Texas, NAT'L Pus. RADIO, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Oct. 28, 2010;
Brian Rogers, Prisoner Ordered Free from Texas Death Row, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 28,2010, at I.
24. See Brian Rogers, Prosecutors Blast Former DA Who Handled Graves Case, Hous. CHRO~ .• Oct. 28,
2010, at AI.
25. See Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFo. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
innocence-and-death-penalty#inn-st (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
26. See, e.g., Sam Howe Verhovek, Karla Tucker Is Now Gone but Several Debates Linger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
1998, atA\2.
27. See Alan Berlow, The Texas Clemency Memos, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2003 (recounting the slipshod
work of legal counsel Alberto Gonzales in analyzing clemency petitions, and observing that Governor Bush never
looked at clemency petitions tiled by inmates, only summaries compiled by Gonzales); see also R. Jeffrey Smith,
Attorneys Criticize Gonzales Clemency Memos, WASH. PosT, Jan. 6, 2005, at A04 (same).
28. See, e.g., Derrick Z. Jackson, Op-Ed, Bush's "Blind" Justice in Texas, Bos. GLOBE, July 2, 2003, at Al9.
29. For a sampling of the most notable decisions, see Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); Callins v.
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989);
Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(1981); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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in a number of recent cases, the Supreme Court has smacked down Texas capital
convictions as unconstitutional. 30
Of course, the amount of attention paid to capital punishment in Texas is
disproportionate to its real-world impact. 31 The State of Texas handles more than
700,000 criminal cases per year, 32 including more than 1000 homicides. 33 Deathpenalty prosecutions account for only a few dozen of those cases. 34 Yet, rhetoric
often outpaces reality. Both supporters and opponents of tough-on-crime policies
point to Texas's use of capital punishment to make their cases. 35 The result is near
universal agreement that Texas is the national leader in the death penalty and that it
is tough on crime. 36 As detailed below, other criminal justice policies in Texas
reinforce the state's reputation for punitiveness.

30. See Mil/er-E/, 545 U.S. at 231 (''The state court's conclusion that the prosecutors' strikes of Fields and
Warren were not racially determined is shown up as wrong to a clear and convincing degree; the state court's
conclusion was unreasonable as well as erroneous."); Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, Death Sentences in
Texas Cases Try Supreme Court's Patience, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at AI ("In the past year, the Supreme Court
has heard three appeals from inmates on death row in Texas, and in each case the prosecutors and the lower courts
suffered stinging reversals."); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5 to 4, Overturn 3 Texas Death Sentences,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, at A22.
31. Professor Doug Berman has raised a related point about the Supreme Court's excessively large death
penalty docket and its focus on fixing individual errors in capital cases. Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of
Time? Examining the Supreme Court's Culture of Death, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 861 (2008).
32. See 2010 County Court Activity Summary by Case Type, TEX. OFFICE OF CT. ADMIN., http:/1168.39.176.29/
OCA!ReportSelection.aspx (select "County Court Data Reports" from drop-down "Report Type" menu, and
select "Case Activity by County" from drop-down "Report" menu; then follow "Continue" hyperlink; then search
"From" for "January 2010" and ''To" for "December 2010"; then follow "Run Report" hyperlink) (noting more
than 508,000 misdemeanor cases filed in county criminal courts during 2010); 2010 District Court Activity
Summary by Case Type, TEx. OFFICE OF CT. ADMIN., http:/1168.39.176.29/0CA!ReportSelection.aspx (select
"County Court Data Reports" from drop-down "Report Type" menu, and select "Case Activity by County" from
drop-down "Report" menu; then follow "Continue" hyperlink; then search "From" for "January 2010" and "To"
for "December 2010"; then follow "Run Report" hyperlink) (identifying more than 210,000 felony cases filed in
2010). Additionally, justice of the peace courts in Texas handle more than two million fine-only misdemeanor
cases per year. See 20 I 0 Justice Court Case load Trends, TEX. OFFICE OF CT. ADMIN., http:/1168.39.176.29/0CA/
ReportSelection.aspx (select "Justice Court Data Reports" from drop-down "Report Type" menu, and select
"Case Activity by County" from drop-down "Report" menu; then follow "Continue" hyperlink; then search
"From" for "January 2010" and "To" for "December 2010"; then follow "Run Report" hyperlink).
33. See 2008 District Court Activity Summary by Case Type, TEX. OFFICE OF CT. ADMIN., http:/1168.39.176.29/
OCA/ReportSelection.aspx (select "District Court Data Reports" from drop-down "Report Type" menu, and
select "Case Activity by County" from drop-down "Report" menu; then follow "Continue" hyperlink; then search
"From" for "January 2008" and "To" for "December 2008"; then follow "Run Report" hyperlink) (identifying
more than 1200 murder cases filed by indictment or information in Texas district courts during calendar year
2008).
34. See Adam M. Gershowitz,lmposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, 72 Mo. L. REv. 73, 93-94 (2007).
35. See, e.g., Brandi Grissom, Perry's Death Penalty Stance a Mixed Bag Nationally, TEX. TRIB. (July 5, 2011 ),
http://www.texastribune.org/texas-politics/2012-presidential-election/perrys-death-penalty-stance-a-mixed-bagnationally/.
36. See Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment, supra note I, at 312.
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B. Texas Is a National Leader in Incarceration
While Texas is most famous for its use of the death penalty, it is also a leader in
the total number of inmates incarcerated. Texas regularly vies for first place in this
category with the much more populous state of California. 37 As of the end of 2008,
Texas had more than 172,000 people in prison. 38 California, which has twelve
million more residents than Texas, 39 had only 1100 more inmates. 40 To its credit,
Texas has taken steps to reduce its prison population by shifting offenders to
substance abuse and mental health treatment centers. 41 Yet, when 2009 came to a
close, Texas still had more than 171,000 people incarcerated. 42
It is not just raw incarceration figures in which Texas is a leader. As a per capita
matter, Texas ranks second nationally (behind Louisiana) in the number of inmates
per residents. 43 According to the National Institute of Corrections, Texas's incarceration rate is about sixty percent higher than the national average.44 Texas also
vastly exceeds the national average in terms of the percentages of people on
probation and parole. 45
In almost every category of prison statistics, Texas leads the nation. As one
author recently explained,
The state's per capita imprisonment rate .. . [is] three times higher than the
Islamic Republic of Iran's. Although Texas ranks fiftieth among states in the
amount of money it spends on indigent criminal defense, it ranks first in prison
growth, first in for-profit imprisonment, first in supermax lockdown, [and] first
in total number of adults under criminal justice supervision .... 46

37. See WU.LIAM J. SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., PRISONERS IN 2008 app. 2 at
17-18 (2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid= 1763 (indicating that Texas led the nation in
incarcerations in 2000, but that California edged ahead in 2008).
38. /d.
39. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS: CALIFORNIA, available at http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (2010 population estimate is 37,253,956), with U.S. CENSUS BuREAU, STATE & CoUNTY QuiCK FACTS: TEXAS, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html
(2010 population estimate is 25,145,561).
40. SABOLETAL.,supranote37,at 17-18.
41. See Unlikely Role Model: Tough-on-Crime Texas Leads the Way in Prison Refonns, Less Crowded Prisons,
Hous. CHRON., Jan. 2, 2010, at Bl.
42. WEST, supra note 2, at tbl. I.
43. McPhee, supra note 4; see PEW CTR. ON mE STATES, TExAs 2 (2007), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/
uploadedFiles/TX%20State%20Profile%202-22-07 .pdf.
44. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT' L INST. OF CORR., STATISTICS FOR THE STATE OF TExAS, available at http://nicic.gov/
StateStats/?st = tx.
45. Seeid.
46. ROBERT PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S PRISON EMPIRE 4 (2010).
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The huge number of persons sentenced to incarceration or awaiting trial in
Texas has resulted in overcrowding at jails throughout the state. 47 In counties
across the state, this overcrowding has led a number of jails to fail inspection.48
The overcrowding situation is so bad in Houston that the county government has
had to contract with out-of-state jails to house hundreds of its inmates.49 Despite
having added 100,000 prison beds since the 1980s, the number of Texas prisoners
is shortly expected to exceed beds by 17,000. 50
Not surprisingly, the over-crowding of Texas prisons and jails goes hand-inhand with awful conditions of confinement. Local media regularly report inmate
deaths occurring in jails due to overcrowding. 51 Texas newspapers have also
highlighted recent federal investigations of both Dallas and Houston jails for civil
rights violations.52 And Texas politicians do not appear remorseful about prison
and jail conditions: although Texas spends forty-three percent less than the
national average to incarcerate each inmate, 53 politicians regularly demand that it

47. See TEX. CR!M. JUSTICE COAL., COSTLY CONFINEMENT & SENSIBLE SOLUTIONS: JAIL OVERCROWDING 3-4
(20 I 0), http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/userfiles/Jail_Overcrowding_Report_FOR_WEB .pdf (identifying reasons for overcrowding among both county jails and private detention facilities).
48. See Lynne Brezosky, 1 in 3 Jails Failing State Check: Harris County Expected to Seek Bonds for More
Beds at Facility, on 2006 List, Hous. CHRON. Apr. 2, 2007, at AI (noting that 73 of 286 jails failed inspection in
2006 and that 4 jails inspected in the first few months of 2007 were under remedial orders for overcrowding). For
a discussion of the most overcrowded jails, see Officials Trying to Ease Overcrowding, DALL. MORNING NEws,
Aug. 14, 2010 (noting that Dallas jails failed inspections from 2003 until 2010, and that when the jail finally
passed inspection in 2010, overcrowding threatened to put it out of compliance again); Tom Bower, Inmates Move
into New Jail Annex; $26.4 Million Addition Raises Total Capacity to 4,294 Prisoners, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS·
NEWS, Aug. 6, 2002, at 3B (noting that Bexar County jail failed inspection because nearly 400 inmates were
sleeping on the floor due to lack of beds); Roma Khanna, Harris County Jail Fails Inspection: Overcrowding,
Broken Toilets Among Complaints, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 18,2009, at 82 (describing effects of overcrowding); Ken
Rodriguez, Commissioners' Concerns About Jail Go Unaddressed, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 30, 2009,
at I B (noting that Bexar County jail had failed inspection six of the last eight years in part because of
overcrowding).
49. See Steve McVicker, First 60 Prisoners Bused to Louisiana: Crowding here Could Force County to
Eventually Send 400 to Private Jail, Hous. CHRON., July 14, 2007, at 84 (describing transfer of Harris County
inmates to Louisiana pri sons); Chris Moran, Excess Jail Space to Reduce Tab for County Taxpayers, Hous.
CHRON. , Dec. 8, 2010, at 8 I (explaining how Harris County sends thousands of jail inmates to Louisiana because
of lack of space).
50. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 43, at I.
51. See, e.g., Ed Housewright, Jailhouse Deaths Spur Lawsuit Against County: 63 Have Died in Seven Years,
DALL. MoRNING NEws, Oct. 14, 2002, at A21 (describing a series of inmate deaths); Steve McVicker, Six Years,
101 Deaths in Harris County Jails: Cruel and Unusual Punishment for Inmates?, Hous. CHRON. (Feb. 18, 2007),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Six -years· I0 1-deaths-in-Harris-County-jails-1545025.php (explaining that the large jail population and staffing shortages result in a lack of adequate medical care).
52. See Cindy George & Bill Murphy, Feds Launch Investigation of County Jail: Department of Justice
Looking for Federal Violations, Hous. CHRON., March 8, 2008, at AI (discussing federal investigations of both
Harris County and Dallas County jails).
53. While the national average to incarcerate an inmate is approximately $24,000 per year, Texas spends less
than$ 14,000. DEP' T OF JUSTICE, NPJ'L INST. OF CORR., supra note 44.
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be done cheaper. 54 The result, not surprisingly, is terrible conditions of confinement.55
C. Huge Prison Sentences Create Big Headlines

In addition to frequent use of capital punishment and overflowing prisons, Texas
also makes headlines by imposing seemingly astronomical sentences in particular
cases. For example, while the mean sentence for robbery defendants in the federal
system is less than seven years, 56 Texas's robbery defendants regularly receive
sentences of forty-five, 57 fifty, 58 seventy, 59 even ninety-nine60 years of incarceration.
Consider the defendant who received thirty-five years for burglary, 61 or the
repeat driving-while-intoxicated ("DWI") defendant (who was charged as a
habitual based on a robbery conviction from many years prior) who was sentenced
to twenty-five years. 62 White-collar offenders are not immune from stiff sentences
either: an offender who stole between $100,000 and $200,000 received a sentence
of twenty years, 63 while a defendant recently convicted of laundering a similar
amount of money received forty years. 64 Similarly, one Texas drug offender caught
with twenty-eight grams of cocaine (and with two prior drug infractions from years
before) received a sentence of ninety-nine years. 65 Sentences may thus seem
unbelievably tough to the public not versed in the availability of paroleparticularly as the media only reports these large upfront sentences-and thus adds
to Texas's reputation of being tough on crime. 66
These huge sentences contribute to Texas's reputation for punitiveness (and
rightly so), but they are somewhat deceiving given Texas's robust parole system.
54. See Chris Moran, Eversole Slams Sheriff over Jail Outsourcing Costs, Hous. CHRON. (June 22, 2010),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article!Eversole-slams-sheriff-over-jail-outsourceing-costs-1717246.
php (describing Harris County Commissioner Jerry Eversole's demands that inmates be housed in cheaper
facilities).
55. For an excellent account of the years of li ligation aimed at improving the conditions of Texas's prisons, see
generally BEN M. CROUCH & JAMES W. MARQUART, AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LmGATED REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS
(1989).
56. U.S. SENT'G COMM., STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET: FISCAL YEAR 2009, STATE OF TEXAS 10 (2010),
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_S tati stics/Federal_Sentenci ng_ Statistics/State_District_Circu it/2009/tx09 .pdf
(identifying the national median and mean sentences for robbery in the federal system as 63 months and 82.2
months).
57. See, e.g., Clemons v. State, 893 S.W.2d 212,214 (Tex. App. 1995).
58. See, e.g., Fluellen v. State, 71 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
59. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 857 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. App. 1993).
60. See, e.g., Darden v. State, 430 S.W.2d 494, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
61. Tomas v. State, 707 S.W.2d 221,221 (Tex. App. 1986).
62. Harris v. State, 204 S.W.3d 19,21-22 (Tex. App. 2006).
63. Quast v. State, No. 01-02-00384-CR, 2003 WL 21470370, at *21-22 (Tex. App. 2003).
64. King v. State, No. 01-08-00457-CR, 2009 WL 1025733, at* I (Tex. App. 2009).
65. Davis v. State, 905 S. W.2d 655, 659 (Tex. App. 1995).
66. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911,
927-28 (2006) (discussing how criminal justice outsiders often misperceive the severity of punishments).
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For most felonies, Texas law requires the defendant to serve only one-quarter of
his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. 67 And credit that prisoners
receive for good behavior--days they did not actually serve-counts towards
completing the one-fourth requirement. 68 For the most serious felonies-murder,
aggravated kidnapping, sexual assault, and a few others-the Code is slightly
tougher and requires defendants to serve at least one-half of their sentences. 69 Yet,
even parole eligibility after serving half of a sentence is a stark contrast from the
federal system and the many other states that have eliminated parole altogether. 70
The option for this early parole almost certainly figures into the sentencing
decisions of judges and plea bargain offers of prosecutors. Judges and prosecutors
who believe a defendant deserves three years' incarceration may impose a
considerably longer sentence to offset parole eligibility and ensure that the
defendant serves at least three years. 7 t And because Texas has extremely broad
sentencing ranges-for instance, five years to life for first degree felonies 72prosecutors and judges have considerable room to increase sentences to account
for the possibility of parole.
The news media dutifully reports the large upfront sentences. 73 After all, it is
easy for reporters (who are already stationed in the courthouse) to generate stories

67. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.§ 508.145(£) (West 2011).
68. See id. For example, in an analysis of Texas offenders who had been paroled between September I, 2010
and September I, 20 II for the crime of burglary of a habitation, I discovered many offenders who served well less
than twenty-five percent of their sentences, with some serving less than fifteen percent. See Texas Department of
Criminal Justice Response to Public Information Request of Adam Gershowitz, Dec. 12, 2011 (on file with the
author).
69. See§ 508.145(d).
70. For a list of states that have abolished parole, see Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Legislatures, Judges, and
Parole Boards: The Allocation of Discretion Under Determinate Sentencing, 62 FLA. L. REv. 1037, 1045-46
(2010).
71. Take the crime of bribery as an example. Under Texas law, bribery is a second degree felony, whi~h carries
a sentencing range of two to twenty years. See TEx. PENAL CODE§ 12.33 (West 2011). The average bribery case
would seem to be on the less serious end of the class of second degree felonies. (For instance, the crime of
robbery, which involves force or threat of force, is also a second degree felony. See id. at § 29.02(b) (West 20 II).
One would therefore expect bribery defendants to be sentenced on the lower end of the two-to-twenty-year
sentencing range. Yet, there are cases in which defendants get much stiffer sentences. See, e.g., Matt Flores,
ACCD Gets Good Report Card: But Strayhorn's Audit Urges Measures That Could Save Millions for District, SAN
ANTONIO ExPRESS, Aug. 23, 2003, at B4 (noting that former official was sentenced to twelve years for bribery).
These tougher sentences may be imposed simply because the defendant deserves the punishment. Another quite
plausible explanation, however, is that prosecutors, suspecting that white-collar defendants charged with
non-violent offenses will receive early parole, push for tougher upfront sentences to offset the possibility of early
release. Cf Elizabeth Albanese, Ex-Trustee Loses Appeal, THE BoND BUYER, Oct. 10, 2006, at 41 (noting that
Texas official sentenced to twelve years for bribery was released on probation after sixteen months).
72. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.32 (West 2009).
73. See, e.g., Serial Child Molester Is Sentenced to Life in Prison for Abusing 8 Boys in Arizona, WASH. PosT
(Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/nationalfone-of-arizonas-most-prolific-child-molesters-sentencedto-560-years-in-prison/2012/0I/13/giQAPSibwP_story.html (reporting that one Arizona defendant received
eleven consecutive life sentences).

HeinOnline -- 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 39 2012

40

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:31

when the facts are neatly packaged for them. News articles about how much time a
paroled felon actually served are much harder to prepare, however. 74 Thus, the
general public hears about the huge upfront sentences, but not the shorter amount
of time that inmates actually serve.
This problem of misinformed or incomplete media reporting also applies before
sentencing even occurs. When a defendant in a high-profile case is on trial,
reporters regularly inform the public of the maximum punishment the defendant
could receive even if, in reality, there is no chance the defendant will be sentenced
anywhere close to that. Although this problem exists in criminal justice systems
across the country, it is particularly problematic in Texas because of the state's
broad sentencing ranges. Consider the crime of possession of certain controlled
substances75-for instance 200 to 400 grams of codeine-which is a seconddegree felon/ 6 punishable by two to twenty years. 77 When NFL football player
Johnny Jolly was arrested for codeine possession, the media explained that Jolly
"face[d] up to twenty years in prison."78 Yet, when his case was actually resolved,
Jolly escaped jail time and was placed on probation. 79
To be sure, Texas authorizes and imposes extremely lengthy sentences on many
defendants. And even with early eligibility for parole, many offenders never again
see the light of day after entering the Texas criminal justice system. Yet, when it
comes to handing down astronomical sentences, Texas's bark appears to be worse
than its bite. In many cases, the availability of parole greatly offsets the ultimate
time served, though not Texas's reputation for toughness.

74. Indeed, even legal academics who rail against the Texas clemency system in death penalty cases have
devoted virtually zero attention to analyzing how parole is granted in non-capital cases. A search of "parole w/1 0
eligib! w/10 Texas" in the JLR database on Westlaw brings up only fifty-five entries, most of which relate to the
death penalty.
75. Another common example is the crime of DWI, which is a Class B misdemeanor for first-time offenders.
See TEX. PENAL CODE§ 49.04 (West 2011). Television and newspaper stories across the state regularly report that
the defendant could be sentenced to up to 180 days of incarceration if convicted. For example, when the daughter
of Houston 's mayor was charged with DWI, media reports regularly stated that she faced "up to 180 days in jail."
See, e.g. , Dale Lezon, Deputy Says Mistakes Made in Mayors Daughters Arrest: Elena White Pleads Not Guilty
in First Day a/Her DWI Trial, Hous. CHRON. , Feb. 6, 2007, at 83. But in the overwhelming majority of cases, the
defendant typically receives probation and serves no jail time. See Adam M. Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men:
The Case for Eliminating Jury Trials in Drunk Driving Cases, 2011 U. ILL L. REv. 961, 965 [hereinafter
Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men). Thus, a criminal justice outsider who follows mainstream media coverage
might believe that Texas punishes its DWI offenders far more harshly than it actually does.
76. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 481.118(d) (West 2011).
77. See TEX. CODE CRJM. PRoc. ANN. art. 12.33 (West 2011).
78. See NFL League Suspends Jolly for 2010: Packers DE Facing Drug Charges After 2008 Arrest, Hous.
CHRON.,July 17, 2010, at6.
79. See Deal Gets Jolly Out of Drug Trial: Packers DE Can Have Case Dismissed if He Fulfills Probation
Requirements, Hous . CHRON., Aug. 4. 2010, at 7. And while the media reported both the statutorily authorized and
actual sentences in Jolly 's case, in many cases with less famous defendants , news reports cover only the maximum
statutorily authorized sentence without running a story when the defendant ultimately receives one far milder.
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D. Shaming Punishments Attract Enormous Attention
Over the last few decades, shaming punishments have garnered increased
attention. 80 Academics have almost universally condemned shaming on numerous
grounds, including the harm caused to human dignity. 81 Despite all the academic
attention, shaming punishments are still fairly rare in the criminal justice system. 82
Yet, when such punishments are imposed, they receive enormous media attention.
And Texas has received a healthy size of that attention.
In the 1990s, the so-called "King of Shame" in the United States was Ted Poe, a
felony court judge in Houston, Texas. 83 Judge Poe imposed a variety of shaming
punishments, including sandwich boards, public apologies, and a requirement that
DWI offenders place bumper stickers on their cars announcing their crimes.84
Judge Poe was known both for the creativity of these alternative sanctions and also
for the sheer number-more than 300--that he imposed. 85 Poe apparently relished
the publicity that carne with alternative sanctions and even coined a term-"Poetic Justice" 86-for his punishments. Local news stories about Poe's sentences
abounded, 87 and Poe turned his publicity into a seat in the United States House of
Representatives. 88
The actions of a single Houston judge would not be particularly remarkable,
except that the publicity has drawn national attention to Texas. For example, a
recent story in USA Today discussed how former-Judge Poe had sentenced
offenders to shovel manure and how another Texas judge had ordered an
abusive father to sleep in a doghouse for thirty days. 89 Similar stories
about Poe's creative sentences have appeared in The Washington Post, 90 The

80. For an example in the academic literature, see Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal
Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880 (1991) (criticizing shaming punishments); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Altenzative
Sanctions Mean , 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1996) (favoring shaming punishments).
81 . See Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for
the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2157,2219 (2001) ("Because shaming punishments have as
their goal the destruction of a person 's reputation and dignity the shaming punishment denies the very dignity of
moral agency that the retributive encounter is designed to uphold.").
82. See Huschka, supra note 5, at 815.
83. !d. at 833.
84. See Developments in the Law, The Legality of Innovative Alternative Sanctions for Nonviolent Crimes, Ill
HARV. L. REV. 1944, 1949 & n.47 (1998).
85. See Huschka, supra note 5, at 833.
86. /d.
87. See The Original Shame Sentence? Rattling the Bones in Ted Poe s Closet, Hous. PRESS, Jan. 22, 2004 ("In
22 years as a Harris County district judge, Lloyd 'Ted' Poe garnered gallons of ink and miles of videotape from a
fawning local media with his zany so-called shame sentences for defendants in his court.").
88. See Huschka, supra note 5, at 833-34.
89. See Jonathan Turley, Shaming Undermines Justice: Americans May Cheer the Idea of Retributive
Punishment, but Such Judgments Threaten the Principles of Our Legal System, USA TODAY, Nov. 17,2009, at
Al3.
90. See Jonathan Turley, Shame on You, WASH. PosT (Sept. 17, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynl
content/article/2005/09/17/AR2005091700064.html.
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Baltimore Sun, 91 Los Angeles Times, 92 The Boston Globe, 93 and local newspapers
around the country. 94 Poe even appeared on Oprah Winfrey's nationally syndicated
television show to discuss his shaming sanctions. 95 Even after leaving the bench
and spending half a decade in Congress, Poe has continued to tour the country
advocating shaming sanctions. 96 In a Pittsburgh suburb, a prosecutor sought a
shaming sanction after hearing Congressman Poe speak to a district attorney's
conference in 2009. 97 The prosecutor explained that Poe is "sort of the modem
father of this kind of stuff. So we thought we'd give it a try." 98
It is important not to make too much of Judge Poe's notoriety, or to focus too
heavily on shaming sanctions themselves. As with the death penalty, shaming
sanctions are still relatively rare in the context of the entire Texas justice system.
Nevertheless, just like capital punishment, the association of shaming sanctions
with Texas serves to foster the state's reputation for being tough on crime.

***
As Part I demonstrates, it is not difficult to see why Texas has a reputation for
being tough on crime. The story is, of course, more nuanced than the bumper
sticker warning not to mess with Texas. In recent years, the Texas criminal justice
system has improved mental health care, added drug and alcohol treatment, and
imposed less stringent penalties for violations of parole and probation. 99 At
bottom, it seems fairly clear that Texas has earned a national reputation for being
tough on defendants who have been convicted, although there is good reason to
believe its reputation is somewhat exaggerated. As detailed in Part II, even if we

91. See Kate Shatzkin, Shame Becomes a Barb in Judges' Quivers, BALT. SuN, May 17, 1998, atA20 (quoting
then-Judge Poe).
92. See Kate Shatzkin, Judges Are Resorting to Shame in Sentencing Criminals: Criminals Wear Placards or
Apologize to Victims Publicly, but Some Legal Experts Say the Tactic Is Useless at Best and Repugnant at Worst,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998 (same).
93. See Michael Grunwald, Shame Makes a Comeback in Courtrooms: US Judges Say Public Humiliations
Can Work Better Than Prison Time, Bos. GLOBE, Dec. 28, 1997 (describing Judge Poe as a "leading advocate").
94. For a sampling of the numerous articles, see Tim Hrenchir, Innovative Judge to Speak at Dinner, TOPEKA
CAP. J., Mar. 30,2002, at I ("A Texas district judge known for giving out sentences designed to shame criminals,
Poe will be guest speaker for the annual fund-raising banquet of Crime Stoppers of Topeka Inc."); Lyda Longa,
Does Shame Deter Crime? That's a Matter of Opinion, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 21, 1999, at AI (describing
"Texas State Judge Poe" as a "leading proponent").
95. See Sarah Fenske, After Oprah: Ted Poe Got the Spotlight for a Shame-Based Sentencing-The Victim Says
It Was a Sham, Hous. PREss (Oct 7, 2004), http://www.houstonpress.com/2004-l ()..()7/news/after-oprah/.
96. See Jon Schmitz & Torsten Ove, Sentence for Theft Is Humiliation in Bedford Town Center, PITTSBURGH
PosT-GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 2009, at AI.
97. ld.
98. /d.
99. See Gray Rohrer, Florida Senators Look to Texas for Prison System Cuts: But Money-Saving Programs
Could Be Too Costly in Tight Budget Year, SuNSHINE ST. NEws (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/
story/florida-senators-look-texas-prison-system-cuts.
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assume Texas is tough on punishment, the complete picture is far more complicated because Texas appears to be quite generous on criminal procedure.
II.

TEXAS

Is

PROGRESSIVE (OR

kr LEAST NOT "TOUGH")

ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

As every student of criminal procedure knows, the Supreme Court ofthe United
States sets a floor of minimum protection for each constitutional guarantee. 100
States may not adopt rules that fall beneath that floor (for example, they may not
eliminate the right to counsel guaranteed by Gideon v. Wainwright), 101 but they are
free to adopt more protective ones (for instance, to mandate counsel in all
misdemeanor cases, although the Supreme Court has not required it). 102 While no
two states have identical codes of criminal procedure, it is clear that some states
have gone well beyond what the Supreme Court mandates, while others have
afforded little additional protection for criminal defendants. 103 Given Texas's
tough-on-crime reputation, conventional wisdom would suggest that the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure should offer criminal defendants little or no added
protection beyond the guarantees of the United States Constitution. That conventional wisdom, however, is wrong.
In a variety of areas, Texas has adopted criminal procedure rules that are much
more favorable to criminal defendants than has been required by the Supreme
Court. While some of these guarantees may be characterized as nuisances to
prosecutors, many of the added protections are major hindrances to their efforts to
convict criminal defendants. Moreover, because most of these protective rules
exist by statute, they could be eliminated by a simple legislative vote. Yet, efforts
to scale back these statutory guarantees have been rejected time and again by the
Texas legislature.
In the Sections that follow, I review a number of the most salient protections
afforded by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure as well as a few rights
guaranteed by the Texas Constitution. My purpose is not to argue that these
protections are unnecessary or harmful to the criminal justice system. To the
contrary, in many areas, the Texas rules helpfully fill in gaps where the Supreme
Court has been insufficiently protective of criminal defendants. My point is to

100. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 585 (2005) [hereinafter
Gershowitz, Gideon].
10 l. 372 U.S. 335 (I 963) (guaranteeing indigent felony defendants a right to appointed counsel); see
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) ("We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,
no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial. ").
102. See State ex rei. Winnie v. Harris, 249 N.W.2d 791 (1977) (extending the right to counsel in Wisconsin
state court to all cases in which the possibility of incarceration exists, rather than all cases in which incarceration
is actually imposed).
103. See generally David C. Brody, Criminal Procedure Under State Law: An Empirical Examination of
Selective New Federalism , 23 JusT. SYs. J. 75 (2002).

HeinOnline -- 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 43 2012

44

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:31

demonstrate that even though Texas is a tough-on-crime state, it has a remarkable
number of generous statutory rules of criminal procedure.
A. Unlike Almost Every Other State, Texas Has No Inevitable Discovery
Exception, Making It Difficult to Admit Illegally Seized Evidence

For nearly three decades, the Supreme Court has recognized an inevitable
discovery exception that allows prosecutors to admit illegally seized evidence
when the trial court finds the police eventually would have found it in a lawful
fashion. 104 By way of example, imagine that a police officer pulls over a suspect
for drunk driving. Upon arresting the driver, the officer unlawfully searches the
trunk of the car and finds cocaine. 105 Even though the cocaine was actually found
during an illegal search, it would be admissible in most courthouses under the
inevitable discovery doctrine: Upon arrest for drunk driving, the car would have
been impounded and the trunk would have been inventoried pursuant to department policy. 106 At that point, the bag of cocaine would inevitably have been
discovered, thus making it admissible. 107 This scenario-and the dozens of similar
ones that occur daily in the United States-demonstrates why prosecutors love the
inevitable discovery exception. 108
When the Supreme Court officially recognized the inevitable discovery doctrine
in 1984, 109 it came as no surprise. In a brief opinion, the Court remarked that every
federal court of appeals in the nation and many state courts had already endorsed
the inevitable discovery doctrine. 110 And the trend has remained one-directional.
Almost thirty years after the Supreme Court's decision, only two states in the
country expressly reject the inevitable discovery doctrine: Texas and Indiana. 111
I 04. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (adopting the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary
rule).
I 05. The search of the trunk is unconstitutional because police cannot search the trunk of the car incident to
arrest, there is no consent for search of the trunk, nor any probable cause to believe contraband is located there.
See State v. Ferguson, 678 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) ("Although there was probable cause to arrest the
defendant ... the officers additionally needed a basis for believing that particular evidence of a crime or specific
contraband was being concealed within the trunk before conducting a warrantless search.").
106. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987) (upholding inventory searches of vehicles so long as
police "discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of
evidence of criminal activity").
107. See Ferguson, 67 S.W.2d at 877 ("The evidence [discovered during an illegal roadside search of
defendant's trunk] would have been inevitably discovered [during subsequent inventory search] if it had not been
removed during the roadside search.").
108. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v. Michigan and Its Ancestors,
93 IowA L. REv. 1741, 1814 (2008) (noting the frequency with which the inevitable discovery exception is
invoked).
109. See Nix, 467 U.S. 431.
110. /d. at440& n.2.
Ill. See State v. Flippo, 575 S.E.2d 170, 188 n.23 (W. Va. 2002) ("Only [Indiana and Texas] appear to have
expressly refused to recognize the inevitable discovery rule.... Additionally, we have found only three states,
South Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming, ... that appear never to have directly addressed the issue of the
inevitable discovery rule.").
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The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure rejects the inevitable discovery doctrine
by statute. 112 The state's exclusionary rule expressly forbids the admission of any
evidence obtained "in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the
State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America." 113
In 1996, Texas's highest criminal court explicitly rejected prosecutors' arguments
to ignore the plain text of the Code, 114 practically inviting the legislature to amend
the statute:
Were we implementing a court-made rule we would of course be free to follow
the lead of the United States Supreme Court. However, because this is a statute
enacted by the Texas Legislature, we are required to interpret the language of
the statute in order to implement the legislative intent in enacting it. 115

A concurring judge was even blunter, noting that the Texas courts are "obliged to
implement the expressed will of the Legislature.'' 116 Despite these direct references to the legislature's primacy and two impassioned dissents to the decision to
bar the inevitable discovery exception, 117 the Texas legislature has never moved to
revise the Code so as to authorize the exception. 118
The Code of Criminal Procedure's continued rejection of the inevitable discovery doctrine makes Texas a complete outlier. The only other state to completely
reject the doctrine-Indiana-has done so based on its state constitution, not
because of a statute that could be overruled by legislative action. 119 Texas stands
alone in rejecting the inevitable discovery doctrine by statutory design. Considering how prosecutors are hampered by the lack of an inevitable discovery exception, the legislature's inaction is nothing short of stunning.

112. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2011).
113. /d.
114. See State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 269-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
115. /d. at 271.
I 16. /d. at 274 (Baird, J. , concurring).
117. See id. (McCormick, J. , concurring in part); id. at 281 (Mansfield, J. , dissenting).
118. The text of article 38.23 has changed very little since it was implemented in 1925, despite numerous court
decisions interpreting it. See Nathan L. Mechler, Texas's Statutory Exclusionary Rule: Analyzing the Inadequacies
of the Current Application of "Other Person(s)" Pursuant to Anicle 38.23(a) of the Texas Code ;f Criminal
Procedure, 36 ST. MARY's L.J. 195, 207-09 (2004).
119. See Ammons v. Sta te, 770 N.E.2d 927, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("[T]he inevitable discovery exception
has not been adopted as a matter of Indiana constitutional law. Our state supreme court has previously held that
our state constitution mandates that the evidence found as a result of an unconstitutional search be suppressed. In
light of this clear language we are not inclined to adopt the inevitable discovery rule as Indiana constitutional
law.") (internal citations omitted); see also Bradford R. Shively, The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine: Indiana as
the Exception, Not the Rule, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 407,430-32 (2008).
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B. Texas Has an Expansive Exclusionary Rule That Suppresses Evidence
Illegally Seized by Private Actors

As all criminal justice observers know, the United States Constitution requires
the suppression of evidence found by illegal police activity. 120 Texas's statutory
exclusionary rule goes even further by excluding evidence illegally procured by
private citizens. 121 Similar to the lack of an inevitable discovery exception, Texas's
expansive exclusionary rule is drastically out-of-step with the rest of the nation and
very beneficial to criminal defendants.
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure specifies that "[n]o evidence obtained by
an officer or other person in violation of [federal or state law] ... shall be admitted
in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case." 122 Under this
rule, if an individual citizen violates a statutory or constitutional guarantee and
turns the resulting evidence over to the police, that evidence will be inadmissible,
even if the police had no connection to the misconduct. 123
For example, in 2005, a priest in Grand Prairie, Texas was charged with
possession of child pornography. 124 Because the lurid images had been illegally
procured by private actors-another priest and a church deacon-who searched
his computer without consent, the judge was forced to suppress the photos. 125 With
no evidence to rely on, state prosecutors had no choice but to dismiss the
charges. 126 Although Texas's statutory exclusionary rule decimated the state
prosecution, federal prosecutors were not restricted by a private actor exclusionary
rule. 127 Federal prosecutors therefore charged the then-former priest with violation
of federal child pornography laws and relied on the very same evidence that was
inadmissible in Texas state court. 128 The former priest pleaded guilty to the federal
charges and was sentenced to more than four years in federal prison. 129
Texas stands alone in embracing a private actor exclusionary rule. In addition to
the federal system, every other state in the nation admits evidence that was
unlawfully seized by private actors. 130

120. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
121. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2011).
122. /d. (emphasis added).
123. See, e.g., Robert Tharp, Evidence Against Priest Tossed in Child Porn Case: GP: Judge Says Evidence
Was Searched lllega/ly, DALL. MORNING NEws, June 10, 2006, at IB (describing the exclusion of evidence
illegally obtained by private citizens).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Jason Trahan, Former Grand Prairie Priest Sentenced to 51-Month Prison Term for Viewing Child
Porn, DALL. MORNING NEws, Dec. 2, 2009, at IB (explaining that federal charges were brought after state
prosecutors were forced to drop the case for lack of evidence).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See Smith v. State, 623 So. 2d 382 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); Cullom v. State, 673 P.2d 904 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983); Hill v. State, 868 S.W.2d 44 (Ark. 1990); People v. Warren, 219 Cal. App. 3d 619 (1990); People v. Siegl,
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There is a historical reason why Texas has such an expansive private actor
exclusionary rule. Prior to prohibition, Texas had its own liquor laws, and private
vigilante groups assisted the police in searching for unlawful whiskey. 131 When the
Texas legislature drafted its exclusionary rule in 1925, legislators were concerned
that these vigilante organizations might take matters into their own hands and
undertake searches without police participation, and that private citizens would
then hand the evidence to law enforcement on a "silver platter." 132 The legislature
thus adopted an exclusionary rule that barred evidence seized illegally by private
citizens. 133
With the disappearance of prohibition and organized vigilante organizations, the
rationale for a private-party exclusionary rule has, at least in part, disappeared. 134
However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has refused to eliminate the rule. 135
In a recent opinion, the Court explained: "Until the Legislature itself decides that
the type of vigilante action prevalent during the early Prohibition era is no longer a
threat to the privacy interests of Texas citizens, we are bound to follow both the
plain language and the manifest legislative intent of the [statute]." 136
The Texas legislature has considered legislation that would delete the "other
person" language, but declined to act on it. Shortly after the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held in 1995 that the statutory exclusionary rule applied to
evidence gathered by private citizens, the Texas House of Representatives intra-

914 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 1996); State v. Betts, 942A.2d 364 (Conn. 2008); State v. Phillips, 366A.2d 1203 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1976); Pomerantz v. State, 372 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Pruitt v. State, 373 S.E.2d 192
(Ga. 1988); State v. Araki, 923 P.2d 891 (Haw. 1996); State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d 1288 (Idaho 19S6); People v.
Clements, 400 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Gajdos v. State, 462 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. 1984); State v. Flynn, 360
N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1985); State v. Boswell, 549 P.2d 919 (Kan. 1976); Brock v. State, 947 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1997);
State v. Abram, 353 So. 2d 1019 (La. 1977); State v. LeGassey, 456 A.2d 366 (Me. 1983); Herbert v. State, 269
A.2d 430 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 503 N.E.2d 654 (Mass. 1987); People v.
Holloway, 267 N.W.2d 454 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990); Lucas v.
State, 381 So. 2d 140 (Miss. 1980); State v. Brasel, 538 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1976); State v. Christensen, 797 P.2d
893 (Mont. 1990); State v. Jolitz, 435 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1989); State v. Miller, 877 P.2d 1044 (Nev. 1994); State v.
Keyser, 369 A.2d 224 (N.H. 1977); State v. Frank, 272 A.2d 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971); State v.
Hernandez, 865 P.2d 1206 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); People v. Adler, 50 N.Y.2d 730 (N.Y. 1980); State v. Sanders,
395 S.E.2d 412 (N.C. 1990); State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 2005); State v. Grant, 620 N.E.2d 50 (Ohio
1993); Turner v. State, 542 P.2d 955 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Bryan, 457 P.2d 661 (Or. Ct. App. 1969);
Commonwealth v. Borecky, 419 A.2d 753 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); State v. Pailon, 590 A.2d 858 (R.I. 1991); State v.
McSwain, 355 S.E.2d 540 (S.C. 1987); State v. Cundy, 201 N.W.2d 236 (S.D. 1972); State v. Burroughs, 926
S.W.2d 243 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Newbold, 581 P.2d 991 (Utah 1972); State v. Young, 12 A.3d 510 (Vt. 2010);
Mills v. Commonwealth, 418 S.E.2d 718 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Agee, 552 P.2d 1084 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976);
State v. Riser, 294 S.E.2d 461 (W.Va. 1982); Mears v. State, 190 N.W.2d 184 (Wis. 1971); State v. Heiner, 682
P.3d 629 (Wyo. 1984).
131. See Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28,34-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
132. Id. at 35.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 36.
135. See id. at 35-36.
136. ld. at 36.
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duced a bill to delete that language. 137 After the proposal was rejected, the bill was
renewed in the subsequent legislative session, but failed once again. 138
Texas's exclusionary rule is considerably more expansive than constitutionally
required. The judiciary has made clear that the legislature alone can change this
rule, yet the legislature has considered and rejected bills to do so. Thus, the Texas
legislature has explicitly chosen to leave a pro-defendant statute on the books.

C. Texas Has an Extremely Narrow Good Faith Exception
In addition to rejecting the inevitable discovery doctrine and excluding evidence
illegally seized by private actors, the Texas statutory exclusionary rule also
contains a very narrow good faith exception. Unlike most jurisdictions, the Texas
exclusionary rule does not allow evidence seized without probable cause to be
admitted simply because of police good faith reliance on a warrant. 139
In 1984, in United States v. Leon, the United States Supreme Court recognized a
good faith exception for evidence seized based on a defective search warrant. t 40 In
Leon, police had procured a warrant for drugs based on an informant's tip and
confirming observations. 141 The trial court later ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to create probable cause, thus rendering the warrant invalid. 142 On appeal
to the Supreme Court, the legal question was whether evidence seized based on a
warrant lacking probable cause could still be admissible if the officer had acted in
good faith reliance on the warrant. 143 The Court sided with the prosecution and
adopted a good faith exception, allowing for the admission of evidence seized with
less than probable cause, 144 so long as the officer relied in good faith on a search
warrant issued by a magistrate. 145

137. See H.R. 2281, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997).
138. See H.R. 1320, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999).
139. See Matthew A. Nelson, An Appeal in Good Faith: Does the Leon Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule Apply in West Virginia?, 105 W. VA. L. REv. 719, 747-50 (2003) (discussing adoption and
rejection of the good faith exception).
140. See 468 U.S . 897 (1984).
141. See id. at 901-02.
142. See id. at 903.
143. See id. at 905.
144. See id. at 926. The Court did issue caveats indicating that the good faith exception could not apply if the
magistrate was not detached or if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing the warrant application. See
id.
145. The Supreme Court's good faith exception caused great concern among the Court's more liberal Justices
because they believed it would green-light police to conduct searches in the absence of probable cause. In the end,
however, the decision has been primarily symbolic. See id. at 928-29 (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting) .
Police officers rarely procure warrants because most searches fall under one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement. It is even rarer for police to procure a warrant, execute it in good faith , but later find out that there
was insufficient evidence to support probable cause. Nevertheless, most states have embraced the Supreme
Court's good faith exception. For a discussion of these points and criticism of the Leon decision on a more
fundamental level, see Donald A. Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986).
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Many states have accepted the Supreme Court's invitation and adopted a good
faith exception for warrants lacking probable cause. 146 Once again, however,
Texas has declined to adopt the rule favored by prosecutors. The Texas statutory
exclusionary rule clearly states that the good faith exception applies only to a
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate "based on probable cause." 147 Despite
protestations by prosecutors, Texas courts have maintained for over two decades
that the Texas good faith exception can only apply to small technical requirements
(such as typographical errors or omissions) in warrants, not to a lack of probable
cause. 148
On multiple occasions, legislators have introduced bills to bring the Texas rule
into line with the federal good faith exception. 149 In 1995, 1997, and 2007, the
Texas legislature rejected these bills, 150 thus retaining a more defendant-friendly
good faith exception.
D. The Texas Code Imposes Tough Restrictions on Admitting Confessions

In addition to the protective search and seizure rules discussed above, the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure also imposes significant restrictions on confessions
that are not required by the federal Constitution.
In the eyes of juries, confessions are typically the most powerful evidence
against criminal defendants. 151 Prosecutors thus love confessions. 152 Because
confessions are so powerful, they are particularly useful when other evidence is
lacking. As a result, police may push hardest for a confession-and use improper
tactics-in the very cases where the evidence is the weakest, thus leading to the

146. See Nelson, supra note 139, at 747-50 (discussing states that have adopted and rejected the good faith
exception).
147. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(b) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
!48. See Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899,912-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (rejecting good faith exception).
!49. See H.R. 1578, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); H.R. 1365, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); H.R.
2047, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995).
!50. See H.R. 1578, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); H.R. 1365, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); H.R.
2047, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995).
!51. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of
Presuming Guilt, 27 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 187, 187 (2003) ("In criminal law, confession evidence is the state's
most potent weapon. Mock jury studies have shown that confessions are more persuasive than other forms of
incriminating evidence, such as eyewitness identifications or character testimony."); Saul M. Kassin & Holly
Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the '"Harmless Error" Rule, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 27,42-43 (1997) ("[M]ockjurors did not sufficiently discount a defendant's confession in reaching a
verdict--even when they saw the confession as coerced .... Our results thus suggest that confession evidence has
a profound, context-resistant impact on jurors and should be admitted only with extreme caution.").
!52. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82
N.C. L. REV. 891, 922 (2004) ("Like police, prosecutors rarely consider the possibility that an entirely innocent
suspect has been made to confess falsely .... When there is a confession, prosecutors tend to charge the defendant
with the highest number and types of offenses and are far less likely to initiate or accept a plea bargain to a reduced
charge.").
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possibility of false confessions. 153 Accordingly, critics have argued that courts
should impose rigorous procedural safeguards-such as videotaping all custodial
interrogations-to ensure that defendants' rights are protected. 154 The Supreme
Court has not done so, however. With the exception of the Miranda doctrine,
which is commonly seen as a "spectacular failure," 155 the Court has imposed little
regulation on confessions. 156 As a supposedly tough-on-crime state, it would make
sense for Texas to follow the Supreme Court's approach and abdicate the
regulation of confessions. Once again, however, Texas has done the opposite by
imposing rigorous statutory rules to regulate confessions.
Although the Supreme Court has long permitted oral confessions to be admitted
so long as they are voluntary and comply with the Miranda doctrine, the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure heavily disfavors them. 157 And there are only two
main exceptions to Texas's general statutory prohibition on oral confessions. 158
First, and in line with the recommendations of many scholars, oral confessions are
permitted in Texas if the statement was electronically recorded and the defendant
clearly waived his rights on the recording. 159 Second, an oral confession can be
admitted against a defendant at trial if, after procuring the confession, police
discover evidence that supports the confession. 160 This "found to be true"
exception applies, for instance, if the defendant orally confessed to a burglary and
the confession led officers to the location of the stolen property. 161 While not as
protective as an electronic recording, the "found to be true" exception helps to

153. See Keith A. Findley & MichaelS. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Visions in Criminal Cases,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 291,335-36 (2006).
154. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127 (2005) (arguing first for legislation, but then for court action as a fallback); see also
Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1051, 1059 (2010) (noting that
mandatory videolaping of confessions is on the rise).
155. George C. Thomas, III, Mirandas Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L.
REv. 1091, 1092 (2003); see Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and Palane Fail to
"Save" Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REv. 645 (2006).
156. See Garrett, supra note 154, at 1110 ("Criminal procedure regulates solely the provision of Miranda
warnings at the outset of a custodial interrogation and Ihe voluntariness of admissions of guilt. Having found the
admission of guilt voluntary, a court does not assess the formation of a confession narrative, no matter how tainted
or unreliable.").
157. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3 (West 2011) (allowing statements "made as a result of
custodial interrogation" to be admissible in trial in only limited circumstances).
I 58. In addition to the two exceptions discussed above, Texas courts are permitted to admit oral statements that
were procured in other states in compliance with those states'law or oral statements procured by federal officials.
See id. at § 8.
159. See id. at§ 3(a). The Code also requires thai all relevant warnings can be heard on the recording, all
material voices (i.e. the interrogating officers and the suspect) are identified on the recording, and a copy of the
recording is produced to the defendant well in advance of trial. See id.
160. See id. al § 3(c).
161 . For examples of the "found to be true" exception, see Robert R. Barton, The Code Means What It Says:
Revisiting the Admissibility of Corroborated Unwritten Custodial Statements, 26 TEX. TECH L. REv. 779, 799-805
(1995).

HeinOnline -- 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 50 2012

2012]

TEXAs: TouGH oN CRIME, SoFT oN CRIMINAL PRocEDURE?

51

prevent against wrongful confessions because the confession must be sufficiently
accurate to lead police to further evidence of the crime.
In addition to strongly favoring written confessions, the Texas Code also
requires that Miranda warnings, plus an additional warning that the defendant has
"the right to terminate the interview at any time," be provided to the suspect in
writing. 162 Moreover, the suspect's waiver of those warnings must be recorded on
the face of his written statement. 163 The Supreme Court of the United States has
never required the Miranda warnings to be in writing, never specified that the
suspect be advised of his "right to terminate the interview at any time," and never
mandated that waiver be in writing on the face of the confession. Indeed, the
Supreme Court recently issued a decision substantially weakening the waiver
doctrine by putting the onus on the defendant to invoke his rights. 164
Finally, and most dramatically different from Supreme Court precedent, the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure actually permits the jury to disregard a
confession if it does not believe the confession was made voluntarily. As in other
states, Texas judges rule on defendants' motions to suppress confessions. 165
However, if a Texas judge refuses to suppress the confession and there is any
evidence presented at trial from which the jury could conclude the confession was
involuntary, the judge must instruct the jury not to consider the confession unless
the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. 166
For example, imagine that a defendant contends that an officer threatened to
break his arm unless he confessed. The officer maintains that no such threat was
made, and the trial judge, believing the officer, denies the suppression motion. In
many courthouses outside of Texas, that would be the end of the matter and the
evidence would be admissible. 167 In Texas, however, if the defendant is able to put
his allegation before the jury, the defendant should have another chance to have the
confession thrown out, this time by the jury. 168
In practice, it is rare for juries to find confessions involuntary. 169 Nevertheless,
the option to place the confession's admissibility before the jury, and effectively to

162. See§ 2(a).
163. See id. at§ 2(b).
164. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
165. See § 6 ("In all cases where a question is raised as to the voluntariness of a statement of an accused, the
court must make an independent finding in the absence of the jury .... ").
166. See id.
167. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 (1964) (noting the Massachusetts rule, which was similar to the
Texas approach, differed from the "orthodox rule" under which "the judge himself solely and finally determines
the voluntariness of the confession ... ");see also T. C. Williams, Voluntariness of Confession Admitted by Court
as Question for Jury, 170 A.L.R. 567 (1947) (categorizing twelve states as leaving the issue of voluntariness
solely for the court, twenty-four states as leaving the issue ultimately for the jury, and seven states as being in
doubt).
168. See§ 6.
169. Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REv. 465,470 (2005).
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put the police department on trial, is an additional tactic available to defense
attorneys.
The Texas Code's detailed requirements for admitting confessions as evidence
makes it more difficult for state prosecutors to utilize confessions than it is for
federal prosecutors working across the street. As with other generous criminal
procedure rules, the legislature has contemplated eliminating the statutory protections for confessions. 170 In 1977, the legislature considered a bill that would have
made oral statements admissible in all cases. 171 Ultimately, the legislature rejected
this sweeping change and instead authorized only a limited exception for recorded
oral confessions. 172 Further bills to eliminate or scale back the oral confession rule
were introduced in 1981, 1985, and 1987, with support of prosecutors from across
the state, yet these efforts failed. 173
E. The Legislature Has Refused to Authorize Sobriety Checkpoints

Despite the fact that Texas has a serious problem with drunk driving-Texas had
more than 1200 drunk-driving fatalities in 2010 and was ranked by MADD as the
second worst state for DWis 174-law enforcement officers have not been permitted to set up sobriety checkpoints for nearly two decades. 175 As explained below,
the prohibition on sobriety checkpoints stems from a poorly reasoned Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals decision that the legislature could easily overrule. Yet, despite
numerous bills having been introduced, the legislature has never acted.
In the 1990 case of Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 176 the Supreme
Court upheld the use of sobriety checkpoints under the special needs exception to
the Fourth Amendment. 177 So long as the checkpoints are effective and operated
with minimum intrusion, they do not violate the Fourth Amendment. 178 A few
years after the Supreme Court's decision in Sitz, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals ruled on the legality of sobriety checkpoints. 179 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held that the Fourth Amendment requires the legislature or
another politically accountable body to specifically authorize sobriety checkpoints

170. George E. Dix, Texas "Confession" Law and Oral Self-Incrimination Statements, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. I,
10-11 (1989) [hereinafter Dix, Texas "Confession "] (describing some of the legislative history of the bill).
171. See id.
172. See id. at II.
173. See id. at 11-14.
174. See Texas, MADD, http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/campaign/state-statsffexas.html (last visited
Nov. 19, 2011).
175. See Holt v. State, 887 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)(en bane) (holding sobriety checkpoints to be
unconstitutional unless and until a politically accountable state body enacted constitutional guidelines for their
use).
176. 496 u.s. 444 (1990).
177. /d. at 449-50, 455.
178. See id. at 455.
179. Holt, 887 S.W.2dat 19.
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before they can be established 180-a complete misreading of the Supreme Court's
Sitz decision. 181 Because the Texas legislature had never explicitly authorized
checkpoints, the Texas court reasoned, such checkpoints are prohibited. 182
As a result of the Holt decision, Texas has become one of only ten states that
forbid sobriety checkpoints. 183 And the majority of those ten states prohibit
checkpoints because their state constitutions require greater protection than the
Fourth Amendment. 184 The Texas Constitution does not preclude checkpoints,
however. A simple bill enacted by the legislature and signed by the Governor could
authorize sobriety checkpoints in Texas. 185 Legislators have attempted to pass a
bill authorizing sobriety checkpoints in almost every legislative session since the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' Holt decision. 186 Yet, despite the enormous
drunk driving problem in Texas 187 and the repeated endorsement of law enforcement organizations, 188 every sobriety checkpoint bill has been defeated. 189

F. The Texas Rules for Denying Bail to Dangerous Defendants Are
Confusing and Restrictive
In addition to the evidentiary issues discussed above, Texas has pre-trial release
rules that are favorable to criminal defendants. The Texas Constitution makes it

180. /d.
181. The Supreme Court never specified approval by a legislative body as a prerequisite to a valid sobriety
checkpoint. On the ambiguities of the Holt decision, see GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT 0. DAWSON, 40 TEXAS
PRACfiCE, CRIMINAL PRACfiCE AND PROCEDURE § I 0.72 (2d ed. 200 I & Supp. 2009).
182. Holt, 887 S.W.2d at 19.
183. Those states are Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Sobriety Checkpoints, MADD (2011), http://www.madd.org/lawsllaw-overview/
Sobriety_Checkpoints_Overview. pdf.
184. See State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057, 1063-64 (Idaho 1988); Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 506 N.W.2d
209, 224-25 (Mich. 1993); Ascher v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994); State v.
Boyanovsky, 743 P.2d 711, 712 (Or. 1987); Pimental v. Dep't of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348, 1351-53 (R.I. 1989);
City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 755 P.2d 775, 776 (Wash. 1988).
185. See Holt, 887 S.W.2d at 19.
186. See H.R. 169, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); S.B. 298, 8lst Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); S.B. 59, 80th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); S.B. 233, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); H.R. 253, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2007); H.R. SO, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005); H.R. 309, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005); S.B. 44, 78th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003); H.R. 226, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003); S.B. 398, 76th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999);
H.R. 1927, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999); S.B. 499, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); S.B. 357, 74th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995); H.R. 263, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995); H.R. 950, 73rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1993).
187. See MADD, supra note 174 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Guillermo Garcia, SAPD Proposals Win Council OK, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 2,
2008, at 3b (noting that the Police Chief of San Antonio was "seeking the Legislature's support for several
beefed-up DWI efforts, including random, roving sobriety checkpoints-a method that is limited under current
state law").
189. See News Roundup, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEws, Nov. 28,2010, at B2 ("North Texas lawmakers plan to
try again to introduce a sobriety checkpoints bill in the new legislative session. Similar legislation has failed
before. The checkpoints have been banned since 1994.").
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difficult for prosecutors to deny bail to dangerous defendants. 190 Not only does the
state constitution impose a complicated set of rules that lawyers can easily
misunderstand, but it also imposes a short window for prosecutors to produce live
evidence in support of a motion to deny bail. 191 Additionally, bond amounts for
many Texas defendants are considerably lower than the amounts imposed by
jurisdictions outside of Texas. 192 In part because of these rules, many defendants
who would be detained in advance of trial in other states are granted bail in Texas.
The Texas Constitution does not permit judges to simply deny bail because the
defendant committed a particularly egregious crime, is a clear threat to the
community, or has a laundry list of prior convictions. 193 Rather, the judge must
determine whether the defendant fits specifically into one of a handful of
(complicated) categories provided by the Constitution. In short, the Texas Constitution allows a defendant to be "no-bonded" when he is accused of committing (1)
a felony and has two previous felony convictions; (2) a felony while out on bail for
a pending felony; (3) a felony involving a deadly weapon, when he has a previous
conviction for a felony; (4) a violent or sexual offense while under supervision
such as probation; (5) a crime of family violence, which violates a condition of
bail; or (6) a capital felony where proof is evident. 194
As the long list of rules above indicates, the Texas bail rules are complicated.
Anecdotally, prosecutors and defense attorneys would likely concede that many
practicing lawyers and felony court judges-even those with considerable experience-simply do not understand the rules governing the denial of bail in Texas
cases. And because prosecutors and judges sometimes do not understand the rules,
they mistakenly fail to deny bail to defendants who fall within the statutory
requirements.
Additionally, even if judges properly deny bail, there is another trap for the
unwary prosecutor. The Texas Constitution requires that judges hold a hearing on
the denial of bail within seven calendar days of defendants' initial incarceration. 195
As Professors Dix and Dawson have observed, the Court of Criminal Appeals
treats the seven-day rule as jurisdictional and enforces it with "care and rigor." 196
Accordingly, in cases where prosecutors and judges fail to initiate such a hearing

190. See GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT 0. DAWSON, 41 TEXAS PRACI"ICE, CRIMINAL PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 16.181 (2d ed. 2001) ("The provisions for denial of bail in certain noncapital cases, contained in article I, section
II a of the Texas Constitution, are in many ways more specific and certainly are more procedurally complex than
those for denial of bail in capital prosecutions.").
191. See TEX. CONST. art. I,§ 1l(a).
192. See, e.g., District Coun Bail Schedule, HARRIS CNTY. DIST. CT., http://www.justex.net/BaiiBondSchedule.
aspx (last visited Dec. 31,201 I); see also infra note 199 (demonstrating Harris County's low rates, as compared
by the author to rates in other jurisdictions).
193. See D1x & DAwsoN, supra note 190, at § 16.12 ("Bail cannot, for example, be denied on the basis that a
felony defendant is accused of numerous offenses.").
194. See TEX. CONST. art. I,§§ 11-llc; TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 17.152 (West 2011).
195. See TEX. CONST. art. I,§ II a.
196. DIX & DAWSON, supra note 190, at§ 16.192.
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and savvy defense lawyers lay low for seven days, the defendant must be granted
bail. 197
Moreover, when bail is available-which it is in most cases-the amount of
money is surprisingly low. In Harris County-Texas's largest jurisdiction-the
standard bail amount for a first degree felony is only $20,000. 198 For non-capital
murder cases, the presumptive bail amount is only $50,000. 199 Similarly low bail
amounts are in place in Fort Worth 200 and Dallas. 201 Judges, of course, are free to
increase bail beyond the standard amounts 202 so long as they do not raise it
impermissibly high? 03 Nevertheless, it is not the least bit unusual for alleged
murderers to be granted bail at fairly low rates in Texas, and remain free pending
trial. 204 And occasionally, murder defendants who have posted low bail amounts of
$50,000, 205 $35,000, 206 or as low as $10,000207 decide to flee rather than show up
for trial.
By contrast, jurisdictions outside of Texas impose much tougher bail amounts.
Many counties-including some in the more liberal state of California-deny bail
outright to all murder defendants?08 In New Jersey, the statewide bail schedule
sets the presumptive minimum bail for murder cases at $250,000, which is more
than five times the presumptive amount in Houston?09 In Los Angeles County,

197. See id.
198. See HARRIS CNTY. DIST. CT., supra note 192. The Court of Criminal Appeals has largely declined to
intervene in counties' use of bail schedules. See D1x & DAWSON, supra note 190, at§ 16.102.
199. See HARRIS CNTY. DIST. CT., supra note 192.
200. See TARRANT COUNTY CRIMINAL DISTR!Cf JUDGES RECOMMENDED BOND SCHEDULE (20 II) (on file with the
author).
20 l. See DALLAS COUNTY RECOMMENDED BOND SCHEDULE (2009) (on file with the author).
202. See Brian Rogers, Pasadena Man Accused of Killing Stepdaughter Posts Bail: Woman Died Saving
Mother from Attack, Husband Says, Hous. CHRON. (Aug. 18, 2008), http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/pasadenanews/article/Pasadena-man-accused-of-killing-stepdaughter-1779454.php (explaining how judge raised murder
defendant's bail from $50,000 to $100,000).
203. The TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE states, quite ambiguously, that bail cannot be used as an
"instrument of oppression." See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 17.15(2) (West 2011).
204. See Renee C. Lee, Defendant Skips Out on Capital Murder Trial: Huntsville Man Was Freed on Bond
Twice in 2006 Case, Hous. CHRON., May 9, 2008, at B I (quoting Montgomery County District Attorney as saying
that "$100,000 bail is not unusual for a non-death penalty capital murder case").
205. See id. ("A Huntsville man who was charged with capital murder in 2006 and then released twice on
[$50,000] bail ... is on the lam after not showing up for his trial.").
206. See Susan Carroll, Elusive Justice: An Abuse of Freedom, Dozens of 1/legal Immigrants out on Bail
Commit Another Crime or Vanish Before Trial, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 17,2008, at AI (fleeing while on $35,000
bond).
207. See Brian Rogers, Change Inspired by 1987 Homicide: Defendant Fled but Did Not Hide His Identity,
Hous. CHRON., Apr. 26,2009, atA8 (fleeing after posting $10,000 bail in 1988 and not located until2009).
208. See, e.g., CRIMINAL BAIL SCHEDULE FOR SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLORIDA, No. 08-03-2(A2) (2010) (on file
with author) (prohibiting bail for any first degree felony punishable by life); SUPER. CT. OF CAL., CouNTY OF
NEVADA FELONY BAIL SCHEDULE (on file with the author) (prohibiting bail in murder cases); TULARE COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURT FELONY/MISDEMEANOR BAIL SCHEDULE (2009) (on file with author) (same).
209. See Memorandum from PhillipS. Carchman, Admin. Dir. of the Courts, to Assignment Judges (May 12,
2005) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY BoND SCHEDULE], http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/directive/criminal/dir_09_05.pdf.
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Califomia-ajurisdiction every bit as busy as Texas's largest cities-the presumptive bail amount for non-capital murder is $1,000,000.Z 10
The divergence is equally clear for felonies other than murder. For many first
degree felonies-for instance, kidnapping, manslaughter, and sexual assaultother states require hundreds of thousands of dollars for defendants to post bail, 211
compared to $20,000 in Houston 212 or $25,000 in Fort Worth 213 and Dallas.Z 14 To
paint an even starker picture, consider that some California jurisdictions set the
same presumptive bail amount for burglary cases and campaign finance violations
that Texas cities use for murder cases. 215
In sum, many Texas defendants find it considerably easier to post bail than their
counterparts in other states. Unlike the search and seizure and confession rules
discussed above, Texas's bond rules result not from the state legislature's choices,
but from the state constitution and from local bond schedules. Nevertheless, the
fact remains that defendants seeking bail in Texas are in a far better situation than
would be expected in a tough-on-crime state.
G. Statutory Discovery Rules Are Far More Favorable to Defendants in
Texas than Most Other Jurisdictions
As a general matter, there is far less discovery in criminal cases than in civil
matters. 216 Defendants have a limited constitutional guarantee to receive favorable
and material evidence under the Brady doctrine, 217 but beyond that, the availability
of discovery is almost entirely a creature of statute.Z 18 And while informal
discovery is present and effective in most well-functioning criminal courthouses,219 defendants' statutory rights to discovery remains important, and, in
most states, quite limited. To the extent there is a national trend toward more
discovery in criminal cases, it is actually a trend toward defendants being required

210. See SUPER. Cr. OF CAL., Los ANGELES COUNTY, FELONY BAIL SCHEDULE 3 (2011) (on file with the author).
211 . See id.; see also NEW JERSEY BOND SCHEDULE, supra note 209.
212. See HARRIS CNTY. DIST. Cr., supra note 192.
213. See TARRANT COUNTY CRIMINAL DISTRICT JUDGES REcOMMENDED BOND SCHEDULE, supra note 200.
214. See DALLAS CouNTY REcOMMENDED BoND ScHEDULE, supra note 201.
215. See Los ANGELES CouNTY, supra note 210, at 3 ($50,000 for campaign violations); TULARE CoUNTY
SUPERIOR CoURT FELONY/MISDEMEANOR BAIL SCHEDULE, supra note 208 ($50,000 for burglary).
216. See John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 2097, 2146-50
(2000).
217. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (i963) (holding that "suppression . .. of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment").
218. But see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding state rules requiring defendants to provide
notice and information to prosecution about their alibi defense).
219. See John G. Douglass, Fatal A/traction ? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY
L.J. 437, 457-62 (2001) (discussing informal discovery and noting that "[f]or the most part, the process works
effectively").
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to produce information to the prosecution. 220 Once again, however, Texas is
different. Not only do Texas defendants have a statutory right to receive considerable discovery, but the Texas Code rejects most of the defendant disclosures
adopted by other states over the last few decades. Additionally, Texas has detailed
discovery obligations with which prosecutors must comply for evidence to be used
at the sentencing phase of trials. These pro-defendant discovery rules are explained
below.
1. Texas Defendants Have Greater Statutory Rights to Discovery than
Defendants in Federal Court and Many Other States

Defendants' rights to statutory discovery vary widely by jurisdiction. As
Professor Jenny Roberts has explained,
Around one-third of the states have relatively broad discovery rules or statutes,
modeled on American Bar Association standards. But about a dozen states
follow the highly restrictive federal rule, which is premised in part on the idea
that a defendant should not be entitled to witness names or statements for
pretrial investigation, but rather only for cross-examination purposes should
the case ever get to that stage. The remaining states fall between the two
models. 221

The discovery divide among the states is best illustrated by the crucial question
of witness lists. In the federal system and in some states, the defendant is not
entitled to know the identity of the prosecution's witnesses until the jury has been
swom. 222 Prosecutors may, as a matter of courtesy, inform defense lawyers in
advance, but there is nothing to prevent prosecutors from the Perry Mason moment
in which the unknown witness walks through the courtroom doors. By contrast,
about half of the states require prosecutors to provide not just witness names, but
also their addresses and prior statements before trial. 223
Texas falls on the more generous end of the scale. Courts have interpreted the
Texas Code to require 224 the State to disclose "a list of witnesses it intends to use at

220. See Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tzlting the Adversarial Balance, 74 CAL. L. REv.
1567, 1569 (1986) ("Beginning early in the 1970's, revolutionary expansion occurred in criminal discovery by the
prosecution against the defense.").
221. Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and
Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1099 (2004).
222. See Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006
WIS. L. REv. 541, 578-79.
223. See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal
Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1585, 1623 (2005).
224. While courts regularly order the disclosure of witness lists, at least two commentators caution that the
word "require" may be too strong. As Professors Dix and Dawson have observed, "the appellate case law contains
no case in which a trial judge's refusal to require the state to provide a complete witness list is held reversible
error." GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT 0. DAWSON, 42 TExAs PRACilCE, CRIMINAL PRACilCE AND PROCEDURE § 22.171 (200 I).
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trjal, photographs, defendant's written statements, letters, accounts, and other
evidence material to any matter in the case.'m5 While Texas is not the single most
generous state in terms of discovery, it is certainly more generous in providing
information to criminal defendants than many states and the federal system.
Moreover, as discussed below, Texas is among a dwindling minority of states that
prevents prosecutors from discovering valuable information from defendants in
advance of trial.
2. Despite a National Trend Toward Requiring Disclosure by Defendants,
Texas Requires Defendants to Produce Almost Nothing in Advance of Trial

Over the last few decades, states have imposed reciprocity requirements that
force defendants to disclose witness lists and preview their defense theory in
exchange for receiving certain discovery from the government. 226 And many states
go even further by giving prosecutors an independent right to discover information
from the defense? 27 State statutes across the country permit prosecutors to
discover information about the defendant's alibi, statements by defense witnesses,
expert reports, tangible objects and a slew of other information. 228
As noted, Texas prosecutors must turn over witness lists and other materials to
defendants in advance of trial. 229 Yet, these prosecutors have no reciprocal right to
receive such discovery from defendants. Texas judges lack statutory authority to
force defendants to produce any information about fact witnesses. 230 As two noted
commentators have remarked, "[t]here is universal agreement that trial judges lack
authority to compel the defense to provide the State with its witness list." 231
While there is good reason not to impose discovery obligations on defendants,232 it is clear that such a firm stance handicaps the government's efforts to
convict defendants. Prosecutors must sometimes "fly blind" at trial and during plea
bargaining because they have no idea who the defense might call and what theory
of the case might be put forward. 233

225. Henricks v. State, 293 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing TEX. CoDE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
39.14 (West 2011)). Although very difficult to obtain, Texas defendants may also seek permission to take
depositions of prosecution witnesses. See TEx. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 39.02 (West 2005).
226. See Mosteller, supra note 220, at 1580.
227. See id. at 1580-81.
228. See id. at 1579-82.
229. See Brown, supra note 223, at 1623.
230. Under the Texas Code, judges may, but need not, require the disclosure of the names and addresses of
expert witnesses. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 39.14(b). Defendants who wish to offer evidence of the
insanity defense must provide notice of their intent to offer that evidence at least twenty days before trial. See id.
at art. 46C.051 (West 2005).
231. See Thornton v. State, 37 S.W.3d 490, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting DIX &
DAWSON, supra note 190, at§ 22.81 (1995)) (internal quotation marks removed).
232. For an argument against too much discovery from defendants, see generally Mosteller, supra note 220.
233. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463, 2531
(2004).
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Once again, the Texas legislature has been in a position to follow the national
trend and adopt a pro-prosecution rule that permits some discovery from defendants before trial, but it has not done so. Indeed, in 1999, the legislature made a
very narrow change to the Texas discovery statute so that judges could, but were
not obligated to, order defendants to disclose their expert witnesses prior to trial. 234
The legislature could have imposed additional burdens on defendants to disclose
fact witnesses and to provide notice of alibi defenses (as many other states have
done), 235 but it declined to do so.
3. Prosecutorial Disclosure of Extraneous Offenses for the Punishment Phase
Is Required by the Code and Is Burdensome to Prosecutors

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure also causes discovery headaches for
prosecutors at the punishment phase of trials. At sentencing, judges and juries are
called upon to consider not just the gravity of the offense committed, but the
offender himself. To do so, the fact-finder looks beyond the instant crime and
considers extraneous behavior, such as prior criminal convictions and bad acts that
did not result in conviction?36 Under article 37.07 of the Texas Code, prosecutors
must give advance notice of all extraneous offenses they plan to introduce at the
punishment stage? 37 Prosecutors must identify the nature of the act, the date when
it happened, the county where it occurred, and the victim who was harmed. 238
Although disclosure of extraneous offenses seems simple in the abstract, it is
actually burdensome to prosecutors. In many Texas counties, prosecutors are
overburdened with huge caseloads and they struggle even to prepare their
case-in-chief. 239 Accordingly, prosecutors sometimes do not tum their attention to
the punishment phase until the eve of trial, and often do not discover valuable
extraneous offenses in time to give notice of the date, location, and victim of prior
misconduct by the defendant. 240 At that point, judges must exclude those extraneous offenses from consideration. 241
For example, consider a hypothetical case in which a defendant has been
indicted for fraudulently selling land she did not own to a poor immigrant named
Maria. A few days before trial, Maria off-handedly mentions to the prosecutor that
234. See Thornton, 37 S.W.3d at 493 (discussing the 1999 revision to TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art.
39.14(b)).
235. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
236. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(3)(g) (West 20 II).
237. See id. Defense attorneys are required to request notice in order for this provision to be applicable, but
most defense attorneys simply do so in a standard fotm discovery request in all of their cases.
238. See id.
239. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 261 (2011).
240. See, e.g., James v. State, 47 S.W.3d 710 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (vacating punishment because prosecutor
failed to provide notice of the date of extraneous sexual abuse allegations admitted into evidence at punishment
stage).
241. See id.
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the defendant committed the same type of land fraud against three other victims
who Maria knew only on a first-name basis. The prosecutor tries to get in touch
with these other three victims but, because time is short, she is unable to contact
them before trial begins. Without the victims' full names and the dates when they
were defrauded, the prosecutor is unable to give proper notice of these extraneous
offenses as required under the Texas Code. In the middle of trial, the prosecutor
finally locates the other three victims and they all indicate they would testify that,
just like Maria, they were tricked into paying for land that the defendant did not
own. This evidence is certainly relevant at the punishment stage and would be
quite helpful to the prosecutor in showing a pattern of misconduct by the
defendant. Yet, the prosecutor likely will be prohibited from using this testimony
because of lack of notice?42 (And, if the statute of limitations has passed, a
stand-alone prosecution for the land fraud would be forbidden as well.)
In the case outlined above, the Texas discovery rules would work an injustice by
forbidding the fact-finder from considering relevant punishment evidence. On the
other hand, there are surely cases where defendants would suffer unfairly if the
rules allowed prosecutors to surprise them with extraneous offenses without
adequate notice. While the optimal amount of notice is debatable, it is noteworthy
that once again Texas has adopted a rule that is more favorable to defendants than
is required. In fact, in requiring notice of extraneous offenses in non-capital cases,
Texas has rejected its own notice rule for death penalty cases. 243 Under the
separate Texas statute governing capital murder cases, prosecutors are not required
to give advance notice before introducing extraneous offenses at the punishment
phase. 244 The legislature could easily apply this rule to non-capital cases, but has
chosen not to do so.
***
In sum, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires prosecutors to provide
defendants with considerable fact discovery as well as notice of extraneous
offenses for the punishment stage, while receiving little discovery in return. The
Texas Code thus advantages defendants by making the discovery process more
burdensome for prosecutors.

242. But see Edward L. Wilkinson, Punishment Evidence: Grunsfeld Ten Years Later, 35 Sr. MARY's L.J. 603,
629,632 (2004) (noting that "the reasonableness of the State's notice turns on the facts and circumstances of each
individual case" and indicating that "[ w]hile notice as late as the Friday before trial beginning the following
Monday has been held to be unreasonable, under other circumstances notice while trial is underway has been held
to be 'reasonable'").
243. See Janet Morrow & Robert Morrow, In a Narrow Grave: Texas Punishment Law in Capital Murder
Cases, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 979, 1095 (2002) ("A capital defendant is not entitled to notice by statute that the State
intends to offer evidence of an unadjudicated extraneous offense against him at punishment, even though Texas
statutes require such notice to the defendant in a non-capital case.").
244. See id.
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H. Texas Defendants in All Criminal Cases-Including Traffic
Violations-Are Entitled to a Jury Trial and Can Even
Request That the Jury Decide Their Sentence
The Supreme Court of the United States has long made clear that criminal
defendants do not have a Sixth Amendment right to a jury in all criminal cases ?45
Rather, defendants must be charged with an offense that carries more than six
months' incarceration in order to qualify for a jury trial under the federal
Constitution. 246 Additionally, with the exception of death penalty cases, the
Supreme Court has never required any jury involvement at the sentencing phase of
trial. 247 These two limitations on the jury trial right ostensibly benefit the
prosecution.Z48 Texas has rejected both rules, however.
I. Defendants in All Cases-Even Those Charged with Running a Stop
Sign-Can Demand a Jury Trial in Texas
Although most states continue to afford a jury trial right in all criminal cases
carrying jail time, nine states have accepted the Supreme Court's invitation and
eliminated the requirement of a jury trial for low-level misdemeanors carrying six
months or less incarceration. 249 In these states, defendants charged with drunk
driving, marijuana possession, and other similarly minor offenses can be sentenced
to jail time without the benefit of a jury. Some states that cannot take this approach
(because their state constitutions require jury trials in all criminal cases) have
managed to eliminate juries for the lowest level offenses by classifying them as
infractions, rather than conventional crimes?50

245. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, IS9-60 (1968) (requiring jury trial only in non-petty criminal
cases).
246. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) ("[N)o offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the
right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized."); Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary
Men, supra note 76, at 10 & n.60.
247. On the history of jury sentencing, see Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L.
REV. 311 (2003).
248. As Professor Andrew Leipold has documented, defense lawyers have a strong preference for juries. See
Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. IS I, 158-63 (2005). The
saying goes that a guilty defendant tries his luck with the jury, while an innocent defendant goes to the judge. See
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, ISO! (1999) ("If juries
are less accurate guilt determiners than judges, innocent defendants will choose to be tried by judges rather than
run the risk of jury mistake, while guilty defendants will choose to be tried by juries, hoping for a mistake. The
acquittal rate should therefore be higher in bench trials-and it is.").
249. See Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men, supra note 76, at 10 & n.61 (enumerating the states that have taken
this approach).
2SO. See. e.g., Mitchell v. Super. Ct., 783 P.2d 731, 738 (Cal. 1989) ("In contrast to the federal jury trial
guaranty which draws a distinction between 'serious' and 'petty' criminal offenses and requires a jury trial only
for those offenses which fall into the 'serious' category, the right to trial by jury embodied in the California
Constitution extends to so-called 'petty' as well as to 'serious' criminal offenses, i.e., to all misdemeanors as well
as to all felonies. Under the California Constitution, only infractions not punishable by imprisonment(§ 19c) are
not within the jury trial guaranty."); see also MODEL PENAL CoDE § 1.04(S) (setting forth a category of
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In Texas, the right to a jury trial remains sacrosanct. 251 Much like the Sixth
Amendment, the Texas Constitution specifies that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury" 252 ; and over thirty
years ago, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the Supreme Court's
invitation to eliminate jury trials in minor cases. 253 Moreover, the Texas Penal
Code classifies even the most minor offenses-such as a traffic ticket for running a
stop sign or driving without insurance-as criminal offenses, not non-criminal
infractions. 254 While these tickets carry only a fine and no jail time, they are
classified as Class C misdemeanors in the Texas Penal Code. 255 Thus, when a
defendant is ticketed for a traffic offense, she has a right to a jury trial. 256
Texas's expansive jury trial right is not simply a paper guarantee with no
real-world significance. Every day, Texas juries are empanelled to handle traffic
cases and other low-level offenses. For instance, on November 4, 20 I 0, the author,
along with thirty-two other people, was called for jury duty in justice of the peace
court in Harris County, Texas to adjudicate a case where the defendant was charged
with running a stop sign. After voir dire, the court empanelled a six-person jury to
hear testimony. The defendant was ultimately convicted.
In another similarly low stakes case, a Harris County defendant was charged
with catching a fish that was a few inches too small-a Class C misdemeanor in
Texas carrying a maximum fine of $500?57 Rather than pay the fine (which the
prosecutor offered to knock down to $50), the defendant insisted on having a trial
by jury. 258 The court summoned forty prospective jurors and empanelled a
six-person jury.Z59 After the jury acquitted the defendant, one juror remarked that
he thought the defendant was guilty, but voted to acquit because "it was a waste of
everyone's time for the prosecutor to drag everyone into court over a fish." 260

"violations" which do not constitute a crime and which "shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage
based on conviction of a criminal offense").
251. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
252. !d.
253. See Franklin v. State, 576 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
254. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.41 (West 2009) ("[A)ny conviction not obtained from a prosecution
under this code shall be classified as follows ... 'Class C misdemeanor' if the offense is punishable by fine
only.").
255. See id. at § 12.23 (West 1994) ("An individual adjudged guilty of a Class C misdemeanor shall be
punished by a fine not to exceed $500.").
256. In fact, the Texas jury trial right is so expansive that it permits defendants convicted of Class C
misdemeanors in justice of the peace court to appeal the conviction to county court and receive a trial de novo. See
TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 4.08 (West 2011).
257. See Interview with Danny Lacayo, Assistant Dist. Att'y, Harris Cnty. Dist. Attorney's Office (Jan. 24,
201 0) (on file with author).
258. Seeid.
259. See id.
260. See id.
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As the under-sized fish case demonstrates, Texas jurors will sometimes nullify
the prosecution of factually guilty defendants because they blame the prosecution
for wasting their time (even though it was the defendant, not the prosecutor, who
invoked the jury trial). Regardless of whether one believes expansive jury trial
rights are good or bad public policy,261 it seems clear that the policy makes it
harder for prosecutors to convict some defendants.
2. Criminal Defendants Have the Option to Choose Between the Jury and
Judge for Sentencing, Allowing Them to Pick Whomever They Think Will Be
Less Punitive

In the federal system and almost all of the states, judges are exclusively
responsible for sentencing in non-capital cases?62 The Texas framework is very
different, however. In Texas, defendants have the exclusive option, prior to trial, to
choose whether to be sentenced by the judge or the jury.Z63 So long as the
defendant does not try to change his election after trial has begun, prosecutors have
no authority to impede a defendant's choice?64 This approach is so unique-and
so favorable to criminal defendants-that only one other state in the nation has
adopted it. 265 As with the search and seizure and confession rules discussed above,
this unique pro-defendant rule is a statutory right that could easily be overruled by
the legislature. 266
The option for jury sentencing is very favorable to Texas criminal defendants.
Because judges are repeat players in the criminal justice system and sentence
hundreds of defendants per year, it is well known in the courthouse which judges
are tough and which are lenient. 267 And because Texas is an indeterminate
sentencing state with extremely broad sentencing ranges, the possible difference

261. I have previously argued that guaranteeing jury trials for low-level offenses is bad public policy. See
Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men, supra note 76.
262. See Nancy J. King & Roosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three State Survey, 57
VAND. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004) (explaining that Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia
allow jury sentencing).
263. See TEX. CooE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.07 § 2(b) (West 2011).
264. See id. The only time a defendant needs permission from the prosecution to change his election from jury
to judge is if he has elected jury sentencing before the start of trial and has subsequently changed his mind. See id.
265. Missouri is the only state to adopt the Texas framework. See Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 557.036(4)(1) (West 2003).
A few other states have adopted jury sentencing, but they give prosecutors more input on the decision to waive the
jury. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DuKE L.J. 951, 1006 (2003) (explaining that in
Arkansas, the defendant needs the consent of the prosecution to waive jury sentencing, and that in Oklahoma and
Virginia, the defendant can only waive jury sentencing with the consent of the prosecutor and the judge);
Jontcheva, supra note 247, at 376-77 ("Kentucky allows waivers of jury sentencing only with the assent of the
prosecution.").
266. As one Texas appellate court explained, "[a] defendant in a criminal case has no constitutional right to
have a jury assess punishment. ... He does, however, have a statutory right to have the jury assess punishment."
Sterry v. State, 959 S.W.2d 249,257 (Tex: App. 1997) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
267. See Gershowitz, /2 Unnecessary Men, supra note 76, at 36-37.
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between the punishment a judge or jury might impose is enormous.268
If judge A is reputed to be extremely tough, defendants in that court typically
elect to have the jury assess punishment because they have better odds of a lighter
sentence. If judge B is regarded as lenient, defendants almost always elect to have
the judge, not the jury, impose punishment. 269 Consider a real-world example from
Harris County, Texas. From 2005 to 2008, Judge Devon Anderson presided over
the I 77th District Court and was regarded as a tough sentencing judge. 270
Defendants who proceeded to trial were thought to regularly elect sentencing by
the jury because they believed they would receive a lighter sentence. In 2008,
Kevin Fine, a defense attorney who campaigned on the idea that his prior problems
with drug addiction would better enable him to deal with many felony defendants,
unseated Judge Anderson. 271 Not surprisingly, in the two years since Judge Fine
has taken the bench, a majority of defendants in the I 77th District Court are now
expected to decline jury sentencing and elect to be sentenced by Judge Fine.
This is not to say that Texas prosecutors always hate the idea of the defendant
having a choice between jury and judge sentencing. As prosecutors and defense
attorneys well know, jury sentencing is a wild card, and sometimes defendants
make the wrong choice. Many prosecutors have war stories in which they feared a
jury would impose a light sentence, only to have the jury impose a far tougher
sentence than the judge likely would have handed down. Those stories are the
exception, however. In most .cases, when defendants have basic background
information about the presiding judge and are presented with the option to choose
between the judge and the jury, the defendants choose the opposite of what the
prosecution would prefer. And the sentence imposed is typically lighter than what
prosecutors would have expected from the other body.
Of course, I do not want to suggest that the lighter sentences defendants
sometimes receive by having the option of choosing between judges and juries is
always a bad thing. In some instances, the option of jury sentencing may serve as a
check against overly punitive judges. My point is that the sentencing choice

268. For instance, in a first degree felony case, a judge could choose to impose ten years while a jury might opt
give the defendant thirty years or more . See TEX. PENAL CoDE § 12.32 (West 2009) (carrying a range of five to
ninety-nine years for first degree felonies). In a second degree felony, the judge could choose to impose the
maximum of twenty years, while the jury could impose the minimum sentence of two years. See id. at § 12.33
(West 2009) (carrying a range of two to twenty years for second degree felonies).
269. To put the matter metaphorically, although Texas defendants do not get two bites at the sentencing apple,
they do have the opportunity to look carefully at one of the apples before deciding which one to bite into.
270. See The I 77th District Coun Judicial Race, LIFE HARRIS CoUNTY CRIM. JusT. CENTER, (Oct. I, 2008,
II :32 PM), http://harriscountycriminaljustice.blogspot.com/2008110/177th-district·court-judicial-race.html (discussing Judge Anderson, in blog maintained by former Assistant District Attorney and current defense attorney,
and noting that she was a "tough judge").
271. See Brian Rogers, Real-Life Experience: With the "Four-Horsemen of Addiction" Behind Him, Newly
Elected Judge Says He's Ready, Hous. CHRON. (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/articlel
New-judge-says-his-former-addiction-can-help-154056l.php.
to
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afforded to Texas defendants is a procedural rule that prosecutors almost uniformly
dislike and that every other state in the nation, save one, has rejected. 272

***

The discussion in Part ll.A through II.H highlights a number of areas in which
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and the Texas Constitution guarantee
significant rights to Texas defendants that they would not receive under the federal
Constitution. These protections, while the most significant, are in no way the only
pro-defendant guarantees provided to Texas defendants. The Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure also imposes more rigorous requirements for conducting
warrantless arrests, 273 tighter restrictions on the execution of search warrants, 274 a
broader right to counsel at probation revocation hearings, 275 and a variety of other
safeguards not compelled by the federal Constitution.
It is important to be modest in stating the limits of my argument. I am not
arguing that Texas has the (or even one of the) most pro-defendant codes of
criminal procedure in the nation. I am also not arguing that the criminal procedure
protections afforded by the Texas Code are bad public policy. Rather, I am simply
making the descriptive observation that Texas is not nearly as tough as its
reputation suggests when it comes to criminal procedure.
III.

WHY

Is TEXAS ToUGH ON CRIME,

BUT

SoFT ON

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE?

Having demonstrated that Texas can be simultaneously tough on crime and
generous in its statutory criminal procedure protections, the lingering question is
"why?" As explained below, there are a number of possible explanations as to why
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure may be protective of criminal defendants.
To be clear at the outset, I do not attempt to offer a unifying theory that reconciles
all of Texas's procedural rules with all of its tough-on-crime policies. It may very
well be impossible, for instance, to explain why the nation's most prolific user of
capital punishment is the only state that rejects the inevitable discovery doctrine by
statute. What I offer below is instead a series of starting points to explain the Texas
dichotomy.
A. There Is No Inconsistency Between Being Tough on Crime and
Generous on Criminal Procedure

The first explanation for the contradiction between being tough on crime and
generous on criminal procedure is that there is in fact no contradiction. Texas could

272. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
273. See TEX. CooECRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.01-06 (West 2011).
274. See id. at art. 18.06 (West 1981) (setting time limit of three days, not counting day of issuance or day of
execution).
275. See Ex parte Shivers, 501 S.W.2d 898, 900-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (interpreting TEX. CoDE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 3 (West 1965)).
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choose to give defendants robust procedural protections before finding them
guilty, but thereafter punish them harshly for violation of the social compact. Put
differently, it is logical to punish harshly when we have afforded defendants
vigorous procedural protections and are sure of their guilt. This theory might
explain why Texas is willing to endure inefficient practices such as jury trials for
traffic infractions and onerous rules for confessions. 276 It also could explain why
the Texas Constitution offers only limited opportunities to deny bail to defendants
who have not yet been convicted. 277 And the theory seems particularly well-suited
to Texans who see their state not simply as a location but as a way of life. 278 An
offense against the State of Texas and its citizens-if we are sure you committed
it-is a great sin deserving of harsh punishment given how exceptional the state is
in the eyes of its citizens.
On a very general level, the social compact theory seems to make sense. But the
explanation breaks down when applied to certain situations. For instance, while
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure offers run-of-the-mill defendants a series of
robust protections, the Texas Code certainly does not go out of its way to protect
capital defendants from unjust death sentences.Z79 The Texas death penalty statute
is the most pro-prosecution capital punishment scheme in the nation, and has long
been criticized for offering insufficient procedural protection.Z8° For decades,
Texas juries have sentenced inmates to death after inadequate trials and substandard representation. 281 Texas's death penalty record therefore makes it difficult to
assert that Texas criminal law and procedure is founded on an idea of giving all
criminal defendants every benefit of the doubt before punishing them harshly. The
social compact argument is also unconvincing when we consider how Texas has
occasionally fought payment to exonerated individuals who are entitled to compensation under the state's wrongful conviction statute.Z82 In short, while there may be
something to the idea that Texas's toughness follows directly from vigorously
protecting procedural rights, the argument has limitations.

276. See supra Parts II .H & II.D.
277. See supra Part II. F.
278. See J.A. Burkhart, Texas, Texans, and Texanism , 9 ANTIOCH REv. 316, 318 (1949).
279. See supra Part I. A.
280. See Morrow & Morrow, supra note 243, at 1002. For a discussion of the legal questions raised by the
statute, see CarolS. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations, Implementation of the Death Penalty in
"Executing " Versus "Symbolic" States in the United States, 84 TEx. L. REV. 1869, 1890-95 (2006).
281. See, e.g. , DAVID R. Dow, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY: LETHAL INJUSTICE ON AMERICA'S DEATH Row
(2005).
282. See, e.g., Harvey Rice, State Rejects Compensation for Wrongly Convicted Man, Hous. CHRON. (Feb. 14,
20 II), ht!p://www.chron.com/default/article/State-denies-compensation-to-wrongly-convicted-man-1692982.php
(refusing to pay $1.4 million to man wrongfully on death row for eighteen years because the judge's order
dismissing the charges did not specifically say the inmate was innocent).
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B. Texas's Distrust of Government Power, Its Penchant for Private Ordering,
and Its Emphasis on Individual Liberty May Explain Criminal
Procedure Guarantees and Tough Punishments

A second, and slightly more persuasive, argument centers around Texas's
engrained gun culture283 and its disdain for excessive government interference. 284
Texans believe strongly in gun ownership and the concomitant idea of private
ordering. They have no problem with punishing offenders harshly and indeed,
Texas has a long history of lynching and vigilante justice.Z85 But when it comes to
government power, Texas has historically been suspicious. 286 While the Texas
Rangers have been revered law enforcement figures for over a century, 287 Texans
by and large remain skeptical of anything that might be seen as encroaching on
individual liberties. This might explain why Texas is unwilling to accept an
inevitable discovery exception that excuses illegal conduct by law enforcement
officers, 288 a good faith exception allowing for warrants lacking probable cause, 289
or sobriety checkpoints that give police wide authority to stop anyone without
suspicion. 290
Texas's concern about governmental power is in contrast to the deference shown
to law enforcement by other states.Z91 To be sure, politicians in other states and in
Congress do occasionally enact pro-defendant criminal procedure protections. Yet,
283. See The Future Is Texas, ECONOMIST (Dec. 21, 2002), http://www.economist.com/node/1487487 ("Texas
was tamed by gun-wielding cowboys and remains thoroughly marinated in gun culture."). On Texas gun laws, see
Riley C. Massey, Bull's Eye: How the 8/st Texas Legislature Nearly Got It Right on Campus Carry, and the 82nd
Should Still Hit the X- Ring, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 199,202-05 (2011); Robert G. Newman, A Farewell to
Arms?-AnAnalysis of Texas Handgun Control Law, 13 ST. MARY's L.J. 601 (1982).
284. See WILLIAM P. RUGER & JASON SORENS, GEO. MASON U., MERCATUS CTR., FREEDOM IN THE 50 STATES:
AN INDEX OF PERSONAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM 9-10 (2009), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/
Freedom_in_the_50_States.pdf (ranking Texas fifth nationally with respect to fiscal policy, regulation, and
paternalism). To name but two prominent anecdotal examples, Texas is home to libertarian hero Ron Paul and has
been at the forefront of electricity deregulation.
285. See PERKINSON, supra note 46, at 142-43.
286. See RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL, GONE TO TEXAS: A HISTORY OF THE LONE STAR STATE 4 71 (2003) (discussing
Texas's distinctiveness and explaining that it has "developed outsized emphasis on many of the qualities and
characteristics regarded as being especially American-a fierce devotion to personal liberty, rampant individualism, and admiration for the superrich, for example"); see also id. at 316 (noting that Democrats in charge of state
government in the late 1800s "offered the least government possible--one that did what was necessary to protect
property and preserve law and order and otherwise kept spending and taxing to a bare minimum"); id. at 382-92
(describing skepticism of Texans toward big-government New Deal programs).
287. See generally MIKE Cox, TIME OF THE RANGERS: FROM 1900TOTHE PRESENT (2009).
288. See supra Part Il.A.
289. See supra Part II. C.
290. See, e.g., Larry Copeland, Drunk Drivers Push Limits: Hard-Core Offenders Prompt Zero Tolerance,
USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 2010, at 3A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-12-08-drunken08_
ST_N.htm (noting that efforts to establish sobriety checkpoints in Texas have failed because of resistance from
"drunks, people who make money off of drunks and civil libertarians").
291. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,378-79
(1974) ("Legislatures have not been, are not now, and are not likely to become sensitive to the concern of
protecting persons under investigation by the police.").
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·as Professor Craig Lerner has shown, this often comes from self-interest or cases
where politicians have had personal encounters with law enforcement. 292 Texas
politicians may not fit this mold, however, because they represent a more
libertarian electorate that harbors a greater distrust of police power?93 Thus, where
politicians in other states might be unwilling to vote for criminal procedure
protections that would be seen as pro-defendant, Texas politicians may be willing
to do so because the vote would be seen as pro-individual liberty.

C. Longstanding Statutory Protections and Short Legislative Sessions May Keep
Pro-Defendant Rules on the Books That Would Otherwise Be Rejected

A third explanation combines the age of Texas's statutory protections with the
very busy and very short legislative sessions in Texas. Some of Texas's prodefendant criminal procedure protections were codified a century ago, before the
politicization of criminal justice issues. 294 And while Texas legislators might reap
political dividends by repealing these protections today, they simply lack the time
to do so because of Texas's brief legislative session. The Texas legislature meets
for only a few months every two years 295 and there is little time for non-essential
bills. 296 Hence, old laws remain unchanged unless there is an enormous groundswell for revision.
For example, the prohibition on oral confessions was added to the Texas Code in
1907. 297 There is no definitive explanation for what led to its enactment a century
ago, 298 but it is clearly unpopular and ripe for deletion from the Code today. 299
Although the legislature has considered repealing the protection a few times in the
past, most legislative efforts have not made it out of committee. 300

292. Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the "American Criminal Class": Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the
Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L REV. 599. As the saying goes, "if a conservative is a liberal who's been
mugged, then a liberal would seem to be a conservative who's been indicted." See id. at 603-04.
293. See CAMPBELL, supra note 286, at 316.
294. Criminal justice issues did not become a major electoral focus until the 1960s. See Aya Gruber, A
Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L REv. I, 39-40 (20 I0).
295. See TEx. CONST. art. 3, §§ 5(a}, 24 (limiting the legislative session to 140 days every 2 years).
296. See, e.g., Editorial, Our Tum; Don't Let Technicalities Torpedo the Worthy Bills, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS,
May 25, 2007, at 8B ('The Texas Legislature meets for five months every two years. That's precious little time to
take care of state business.").
297. See Act of Aprill6, 1907, ch. 68, 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws 219; see also Dix, Texas "Confession", supra note
170, at 7.
298. Scholars cite a case in which a sheriff claimed a prisoner had orally confessed to murder, but it was later
discovered that the prisoner only spoke Swedish, which the sheriff clearly did not speak. See Dix, Texas
"Confession", supra note 170, at 8. As Professor Dix has explained, "(w]hether such a case ever occurred and, if
so, whether it was the motivating factor for the oral confession rule is uncertain." /d.
299. See id. at 4 (recounting outraged reaction when a high-profile murder case was overturned due to the oral
confession rule).
300. See id. at 13-14.
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The same logic helps to explain why the Code's restrictive good faith exception
and its private actor exclusionary rule have not been jettisoned. 301 Individual
legislators have introduced legislation to abolish those protections, but the efforts
have never proceeded very far. 302 For example, in 1997, a bill with the sole
purpose of eliminating the exclusionary rule for evidence seized illegally by
private actors died in committee a month after being introduced. 303 In 1999, a
similar bill fared even worse, never even receiving a sub-committee hearing. 304
Multiple bills to expand Texas's narrow good faith exception have likewise never
been reported out of subcornmittee. 305
The explanatory power of the "old rule, busy legislature" theory is limited,
however. Texas is not the only state with a busy legislature, and Texas politicians
know just as well as their colleagues in other states that being tough on crime
(including eliminating unpopular protections for unpopular defendants) sells well
at the ballot box. 306 In short, the theory that limited legislative time preserves
pro-defendant rules likely explains why less salient criminal procedure protections
have not come under attack. But the theory, by itself, is insufficient to explain the
continued existence of the most valuable procedural protections (such as the
statutory confession rules) guaranteed in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
D. Being Tough on Crime May Provide Cover for Being Generous on
Criminal Procedure

A fourth explanation is that Texas's well-known reputation for being tough on
crime eliminates or at least reduces pressure on Texas legislators to curb criminalprocedural protections. Under this explanation, the harsh punishments imposed in
Texas leads to its citizens either: (1) wrongly assuming that the state is also stingy
on criminal procedure protections for defendants; or (2) not being troubled by any
beneficial procedural protections because of the sheer magnitude of punishment
for those who are convicted. Under either theory, there is less public outrage about
pro-defendant protections in Texas than in other states, and less pressure on Texas
politicians to eliminate those statutory guarantees.
Once again, there is likely some truth to this argument. Very few citizens
(whether from Texas or elsewhere) recognize that the Texas Code of Criminal

30 I. See supra Parts Il.B & II.C.
302. See H.R. 2281, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997).
303. See id.
304. See H.R. 1320, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999).
305. See H.R. 1578, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); H.R. 1365, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); H.R.
2047, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995).
306. See Gruber, supra note 294, at 60. Moreover, by eliminating obstacles to convictions, politicians increase
the number of felons. The disenfranchisement of these felons in tum reduces the number of progressive voters
who might vote against sitting conservative politicians. See id. ("Supporting crime control initiatives is especially
rewarding for conservative politicians because increasing felony convictions leads to the disenfranchisement of
those who, if they chose to vote, would likely vote for progressive candidates and policies.").
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Procedure contains numerous pro-defendant guarantees. And to the extent that
observers are aware of pro-defendant rules, they may wrongly attribute them to
court decisions, rather than blame the legislature for them. 307
It is important not to take this explanation too far, however. As I explained in
Part I, Texas is not as tough on crime as it appears. Defendants often receive the
lower end of huge sentencing ranges, 308 and when tough sentences are meted out,
they are often reduced by parole. 309 More to the point, when defendants receive
lighter than expected sentences 310 or when criminal cases fall apart because of
procedural problems (such as illegal searches 311 or invalid confessions 312 ), the
news media is all too happy to highlight those cases. 313 Similar news stories
abound when accused criminals are granted bail and subsequently flee or commit
new crimes? 14 With media attention brought to bear, public backlash is inevitable.
Texas politicians, just like their counterparts throughout the nation, therefore
campaign as being tough on crime. 315 Once elected, politicians who want to
bolster their reputations (and be re-elected) should seemingly look to statutory
criminal procedure guarantees as low-hanging fruit to be eliminated. And, in fact,
individual legislators have unsuccessfully moved to scale back many of the
pro-defendant statutory rules discussed in Part II. 316
At bottom, Texas reputation for being tough-on-crime likely staves off some
public resentment toward favorable criminal procedure guarantees. But, by itself,
the perception of Texas's punitiveness is likely insufficient to explain its favorable
Code of Criminal Procedure.

***
In the end, there is likely some truth to all four explanations discussed above.
Protective criminal procedure protections are not necessarily inconsistent with
307. Popular (though not necessarily accurate) criticism of the criminal justice system almost universally lays
blame on "activist judges" rather than legislative decisions. See, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: How THE
SUPREME COURT Is DESTROYING AMERICA (2005).
308. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 63-<i7 and accompanying text.
310. See Richard Stewart, Sentence Angers Victims' Family: Brazoria County Jury Gives Driver 4 Years in
Prison for 2 DWI Deaths, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 30, 2008, at 82 (describing disappointment of victim and
prosecutors with "very light" sentence).
311. See, e.g., Tanya Eiserer, Prosecutors Seek Dismissal of Drug-Case Charges: Judge Throws Out Evidence;
Police Unit Already Under Review, DALL. MORNING NEws, Mar. 17,2009, at 38 (suppressing search premised on
consent because police threatened to incarcerate suspect's wife and place his child with protective services).
312. See, e.g., Amy Green, Judge Tosses Out Nowak Evidence: Impact on the Ex-Astronauts Case Is Unknown
After the Ruling She Was Misled by Police, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 3, 2007, at A3.
313. See supra notes 277-79.
314. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., Ian McCann, Challenger Calls Out Madden on Ethics: Incumbent Dismisses Allegations, Says
Cole Inexperienced, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Feb. 28, 2008, at I B (noting that challenger asserted his opponent
was "soft on crime" ).
316. See supra notes 127-28, 138, 156-58, 167, 212-13 and accompanying text.
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punishing convicted defendants harshly. And Texas's historical distrust of governmental power may explain why the Texas Code makes it easier to suppress
searches and confessions than other states. To the extent there is public support for
eliminating some pro-defendant rules of procedure, entropy and a short legislative
session may keep those protections on the books. And perhaps more so than in
other states, the universal recognition that Texas is tough on crime may limit public
pressure to roll back criminal procedure protections.
CONCLUSION

When it comes to punishing convicted defendants, Texas Toughness 317 is no
myth. Texas is the most prolific user of capital punishment, and it is a national
leader in incarceration. From a symbolic standpoint, Texas imposes enormous
prison sentences on many offenders and has been at the forefront of the public
shaming movement. Texas, simply put, is tough on crime.
Yet, the story of Texas criminal procedure is much more complicated and more
pro-defendant than Texas's general reputation for punitiveness suggests. Texas
defendants benefit from a variety of criminal procedure protections that go well
beyond what is mandated by the Supreme Court of the United States. And contrary
to the tough-on-crime rhetoric of Texas politicians, many of these criminal
procedure protections could have been eliminated long ago because they are
statutory, rather than judicial, rules. Yet, legislators have declined to repeal the
numerous pro-defendant protections found in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
The point of this Article is not to definitively resolve the reason for the Texas
dichotomy. Nor is my goal to encourage legislators to abolish favorable rules of
procedure. The aim of this Article is to demonstrate that Texas is not nearly as
tough on criminal procedure as its reputation suggests.
There are a number of possible reasons why Texas continues to retain a generous
code of criminal procedure. Distrust of governmental power may explain the
continued existence of certain protections against aggressive police tactics, while
Texas's short legislative session may protect less prominent rules from being
repealed. In the bigger picture, Texas's reputation for punitiveness may insulate
legislators from pressure to scale back procedural protections. Texans may also see
robust procedural protections as essential before punishing offenders for breaking
the social compact. In all likelihood, all of these explanations have a role to play in
explaining the wide divergence between Texas's reputation for punitiveness and its
generous statutory code of criminal procedure.

317. See PERKINSON, supra note 46.
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